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/.•I St ,, '~:on . 
SENATE 
TilE ~LJCLEAR TE T BAN TREATY 
Tr ESIH Y, SEPTEMBER 3, 1903.-0rdered to be printed 
~[r. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted 
the following 
REPORT 
[To accompany l<:x. M, 88th Cong., 1st sess.] 
The Committee on Foreign Relation~, to whom was referred Execu-
t i,·e l\I, 88th Congress, 1st S<>~sion, the treaty Lanning nuclear weapon 
te~ts in the atmosphere, in outer !';pace, and underwater, signed at 
:\Ioscow on August.:;, 196:3, on uehalf of thP 1-nited States of _\ merica, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and ~orthern Ireland, and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having considered same, report 
the treaty favorably and recommend that the Senate give its advice 
nnd consent to ratification. 
I. PGRPOSE .\ND B .\(' JWJWGXD (JJ" THE TRE.\TY 
The treaty's primary pnrpo"'e is to inhibit tlw arms race by ban-
ning nuclear tests in the atmosplwre, in outer space, <tn<l underwater. 
~\s such, it represents a small uut firm step t.owurd arms control, and 
thusbearsasignificancethat lie beyond its brief nnd simple text. For 
mo~e than a decade the possibilit.Y of nuc·lear war, inadmissible by any 
rut10nal standard, has st,ooc.l l)(>fore the world. .Although the posSI-
bility remains, this treaty marks the beginning of what, hopefully, ,,, j]l 
hPCome a continuing effort in every responsible quarter to remove it. 
Through the years the Pnitetl State.;; and the Soviet "Cnion, 
the chief nuclear powers, huxe each offered test Lan proposals that the 
qther would not, or could not, accept. In 1946, the "Cnited States, then 
"'ith a clear monopoly of nuclear knowlec4?;e and power, proposed 1 he 
E.'Stablishment of an intemational atomic aevelopment :wthot·ity, '·to 
which should he entrusted all phases of the cle,·elopment and ltse of 
atomic energy, tariing \\'ith ra"· 1naterials flllll including manag'(lrial 
f'Ontrol, inspection, use of atomic energy for pPUf'Pfnl purposes, re-
-:parc·h, a11d rlewlopmrnt.'' Tlw nfl'er '"ns J'r>je<·r pcl hy tlte ~oviet 
1-nion. · 
Mike Mansfield Papers: Series 21, Box 42 , Folder 1, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
2 THE NUCLEAR TEST BA...'l" TREA'l'Y 
~incc then. the Cnited. States (latterly with British eosponsorship) 
has sought on numerous occasions to limit or ban nuclear testing: U.S. 
draft agreements have been either self-enforcing, as in the case of this 
limited~test ban tr~a.ly, or have guaranteed on-stte inspection ri~hts to 
the parties. n.s in the case of proposals for romprehensiYe prohioitions 
on testing. Heretofore, the So,riet Union bas rejeded all of these pro-
posals, and, on its part, has advanced cou11terproposals that the Uniterl 
States would not accept owing to tbeir lack of adequate control and 
inspertion provisions. 
In 1058, an infonnal and IIIloffieial moratorium on nurlear testing- by 
the Unit.ecl States, Britnin, ancl the Soviet TTnion began.1 Technirally, 
il ended on December 29, 1959, when Prc._c:;iclent Eisenhower stated 
that the United States considered itself "free to resurue nuclear 
weapons testing" subject to advance nobfication of such intention. In 
fact, the moratorium ended on September 1, 1061, when the Soviet 
rnion, after what HtUSt have heen long and secret preparat.ion, com-
menced an intensive series of atmospheric nnc]ear weapons tests. In 
response, the United Statf.'S befran testing underground 2 weeks later 
and resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in April 1962. 
On August 27, 1962. the United States a.nd Britain submitted to the 
"P.X.-sponsored 18-ntttjon Disarmament Conference a comprehensive 
test han treat~\ together with a treaty prohihiting: tests i11 the atmos-
phere, in outer space, and in the oceitns and territorial wrters. Both 
Governments indicated a preference for the broader agreement, but 
ofl'ererl the three-environment draft with this comment: 
rnlike a ban on te:-;tinrx in all environments including unll<'rgronnd, a treaty 
banning t~ts in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outPr "pace can be effec-
th'ely verifiro without onsite inspection&. Such a lt·<'aty would rPsnlt in a definite 
downward turn in the arm race as it is representpd by le~ttin:r to dev-elop weap-
ons te<>hnolo.!ry. It would make it easier to prevent the sprE>atl of nuclear weapons 
to eountries not now possessing them. It would free mankind from the dan1!ers 
and fe:lr of rnclioacti\·e fallout. Furthermore. a~·e<>nH>nt on Anch a trE-nty might 
be a first step tow·artl an agreement banning testing in all environments. 
The limited test ban is an American proposal. Its substance was 
first offered by President Eisenhower, who, with British support, pro-
posed in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev on April 13, 1959, a -pro-
hibition on atmospheric tests up to 50 kilometers. On-site inspectiOns 
would not have boen required. :Mr. Khrushchev rejected the Presi-
dent's proposal on the ,gronnd that it would not attain tho bnsir goa] 
of ''preyen6ng the production of new and ever morf' dest rnet i ve typrs 
of nuclear weapons." The Soviet Govemment held this position until 
July 1963 when it a.greed to the three-environment treaty before the 
Senate. 
\Vhy has the Soviet Union accepted what heretofore it has con-
sistenrly rejected~ 
The question is relevant and important, but any evahmtion of Soviet 
motives ic:; nert-.ssari]y speculative. It is genera1ly folt that the deciP.ion 
arose from a number of considerations, most of them related. First, 
the large SoYiet tests serieP. of 1!)61 and 1062 proYicled ~orne n~~nrnn(·f' 
that tlw Soviet Union could accept the technologirnl ronsNplPnre~ of 
a test ban treaty. Althongh it is difficult for one powrr to eYa]naf~ 
1 France. not a party to the moratorium, exploded an atomic device In F<>bruary 19GO 
and brcnme the fou rth nuclear power. 
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the tl•t·luw lo•rica 1 kuow led~e of a not her pO\Yer. ~m·iet ~I' ic>nt ist~ pre-
:-umnh1Y arc ~oufidtollt that in Ill ally erit i<'al areas of lltH.:lear weaponry 
the\' h,ivc aeh iPVe<l a mu~h technical parity with the l;Hit.ed States. 
~eeond. tlw Cuban mi:-:-:>ile crisis of the fall l!lti~ was almo:-t err-
tainlv a ~oberiug- experieu<·c. Xnclear war nhrupt ly became lt>ss an 
ab:-;ti~ac-t po--:;ibilit.\· than OJll' of harsh immerliacy .. b :-iecretary of 
~~ate H u~k told the eomm itt PC: 
During this Jl:1St y<>ar, for the fir:-;t time in bi)'tory, uudear powers had to 
look nt a nuciE>ar exehnn~c as an operational matter. :\len had a ehance to 
J•l•Pr into the pit of the lnfPrno. 
Third is the Sino-Soviet schism, to which the que ·t ion of nucl< .. ar 
warfare is dosely related. Shonlcl tlw objectiYes of international 
communi;,:m he gainrd through war and military supn•maey or by 
otlH'I'les;.; haz·trdons IIH'ans~ fn part, thi:-; appears to be a doctrinal 
?tru~f!le behn'"ll tlw (':-;ta.hlic;hcd churrh adjt~stlllg it· polici<.•s tr~ :hift-
ltl" tid<>s and new re,p11remcnt~, and the 1solate<l <'hurch n11l1tnnt. 
J>(~·hap::> in lar~t·r part, the struggle transcencls ideology ancl reflect -
an ine,·itablc conflict of interests between a unitccl and <'xpa11:-.ionis t 
China and one of her historic antagonists. llnssia. The quarrE>1 ha!", 
of ('OU r~e, crt•at(•d new issues and new problems throu~hont the Com-
munist world. It is widPly beliewd that Chairman KhrnshcheY, 
c·ommunism's apostle of coexistence, required some kinLl of tangible 
expression of his policy as a practical political matter. The test 
han treaty is popular, not only in the Soviet Union, bnt also in the 
East European satell ites, whieh rc•cently haYe shown signs of re<:tin-
ness and slightly more independence of close Soviet control. Thus, 
the limited test ban could strengthen Mr. KhrushcheY's political base, 
both at home and throughout most of his empire. 
Fourth, the social and ,political fermPnt in the So,·iet rnion may 
h:wo encouraged the SoYiet leadership to reach an agreement that 
would allow ·on1e di,·e1-sion of resources nwa.y from nuclear weapons 
deYelopment and tow:u·d the consumer goods area.2 The bnrclen of 
the arms c·ompet it ion ha:-; hacl a <lcp1·essing eife('t on SoYiet economic 
g-rowth. In the past :; years. ~oYiet military in,·estment has risen 
sig-nificantly, whilt> the rate of increase in the ~ro!"s national product 
has dipped sharply. ..:\. cause and e fl'ect relationship has been 
indicated. 
Finally, Soviet leadership seems to share Washington's concern with 
the problem of prol i fera.tion of nuclear weapons. The treaty provides 
no guarantee against. proliferation; however. leaving aside France 
(already a llU('lenr powrr) nncl mainland ('hina, it should stron~ly in-
hibit the spread of nuclear weapons. The committee heard testjmony 
that. a munber of countries haYe the human and material resources to 
den•lop nu(']Par weapons O\~er the next decade. But as the Secretary 
of State told the committee: 
~lost of the countries with the capacity and incentive • • • baYe already 
:wnouncc<l that ttwy will at·cept tbe self-denying ordinance of lhe treaty. While 
thi~ doe,.:: nor ~uarnntee that th<•y will neYer become nuclear powers, their re· 
nnndation of atllln,.::),h<>ric tP~ting" o;vill act a~ a <letNreut by making it much 
more difficult and expensive for them to deYelop nuclear wpapo11s. 
2 "Communl~m cannot be depicted as a table laid with empty plates and occupied by 
highly conscious and com)>l<"tely equal people. To Invite people to ~uch communism Is 
tautamount to Inviting ppople to eat soup with a fork." Nlklta Kbrushcbev's opening 
"llN•ch to the Commanlst Pnrty Central Commltteij Plenum, Mar. 5, 1962. 
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For the rnitetl ~tat('·. the rati01iale of the treaty has not chtm~ed 
-.ig:niticantly since the first propo~u] of this kin(l wa~ put forwara in 
1959. The balunce of risks in tt limited test han-the possible a.d-
,·antage~ anJ di:-:uhanta~l.'s to tlw Cnitecl ~tate::. and. illdt•t.>d, to \Ye ... t-
ern civilization-appears to favor the treaty. l'.S. strategic force.-; 
are superior to the Soviet Fnion's; whatever progress Soviet science 
may lun·e made in improving Soviet weapon capabilities. a nuclear 
ntttwk against the United States on any scale would assure the devasta-
tion of the Soviet Union in a retaliatory blow. The security of the 
Cnited States and its allies rests ultimately with this second-strike 
(':\ pabili tv. 
The treaty is a n•eogniL ion of the hamrcl po~d by an unlimited 
c·ontinuation of the nuclear tU1ns r~lt:e O\et' an indefinite period. As 
the arms increase in ,-ariety, number, refinement. and destructi\e 
power, so presumably will the danger that they might be used, either 
r>y accident or design. This is a prospect that confronts the l~nited 
State and the So,i t-t Gnion quite impartia11y, and one upon which 
their intere~ts meet. 
IJ. ~l BST.\XCE OF THE TRE.\TY 
.\RTICLE I 
The treaty consists of a preamble and fixe articles. The committee 
" ·ns assured by the Pr~ident that: 
This treaty is the whole agreement. li.S. negotiators in :\loS<:ow were in-
structed not to make this agreement <.:onditioned upon nuy other understanding; 
and they made none. The treaty speaks for itself. 
The text, in the main, il:l similar to the draft treaty for a limited 
t08t ban proposed by the rnited ~tates and the United Kingdom in 
Henenl on August 27. Hl6~. 
Article I obliges the part iPs '·to prohibit. to prewnt. an<l not to rarry 
out any nuclear WNtpon lt•st explosio11, or any other nnrlear l'Xplosioll. 
at any place under its jurisdiction or control;' in three l"nvironments-
the atmosphere. underwater, and outer space. Outer spa.ce is. of 
eours(', r('garded as existing without outer limit. The prohibition on 
underwater testing rPatls: ''nndrrwater, inrlnding trrritorial waters or 
hil!h sea~ ... which, a~ Secretary of State Rusk told the conm1ittPP, 
''includes inland wa.ters-la.kes, rivers within the territory." 
.Article I also ban~ testing "in any other environment.'' meaning un-
derground, "if such explosion eauses radioactive debris to bf' preSPnt 
outside the territorial limits of the state nncler whose jul'i~diction o1· 
('Ontro] such explosion is concluded .. , 
Finally, the partiE's, in ntl<lition to <lenyin~ thPntseln>!" thP ri~ht 
of nuclear testing in the prohibited em·ironments, nrt> obliged to with-
hold any a~c:;istance or encouragement that mig-ht rontribute to ••the 
carrying out ~f any nuclear explosion" in one of these em·ironments 
by another nnt10n. 
·The phrase "or any othrr nuclear explosion." O<'enrs twi1'e in artiele 
T. It clid uot ar~ ~P:tr in thP .\ugust 27 draft trt>aty, but wn:- nclcled on 
I he initiative of the rnit~d States to the pending treaty in order to 
prevent explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purpo~ in the 
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prohii.Jited em·ironments; such explosions, uninspected, could provide 
a moons of evading the purpose of the treaty. The August 27 draft 
containNl a. pro•ision (art. II) that excluded explosions for peaceful 
purposE's from the prohibition. 
The explanation for its absence from this treaty wa set forth in 
a memorandum to the committee from the Legal ... \dviser of the Depart-
ment of State, which appears as appendix I to this report. The rele-
''ant paragraph reads as follows : 
In the course of the ~fo ·cow negotiations. the Soviets rejected article II of 
the August 1002 draft completely. This rejection would have left a loophole 
in the treaty if article I bad remained confined to "nuclear weapon test ex-
plosions." A party might have conducted explosions revealing valuable military 
data or even weapon tests on the pretense that they were in fact peaceful pur· 
(lOse;; explosions and not "nuclear weapon test explosions." In order to close 
thll:l loophole. thP phrase "any other nuclear explosion" was inserted in article I 
at the appropriate points. Its purpose is to prevent, in the specified environ-
ments, peacetime nuclear explosions that are not weapons teRts. Tbat is its 
only significance. 
L'"SE OF ~T'CLE.\R WE.\POXS I~ E\'ENT OF HO~TILITIES XOT AFFECTED 
BY TREATY 
Th(' langnag:e '·or nny other nuclear explosion'' also created a ques-
tion whether m a reclmical sense it might limit the Prt'si<lent's au-
thority to use nuclear weapons in time of war. This question was 
raised most pointedly by former President Eisenhower who, when he 
endorsed the treaty, suggested it be made absolutely rlear "that in the 
event of any armed aggression endangerht~ a vital interest of the 
Unit-ed Stntes this Xation would be the sole judge of the kind and 
type of wenponry and equipment it would employ as well as the 
timing of its use." 
As a practical matter, it would be inconceivable that the treaty, or 
any of 1ts prO\-i ions, coulJ affect a decision to use nuclear weapons 
shouJd a situation deYelop in which the security of the United States 
or any of its nlliC's nppeared to be in jeopardy. Both the President, 
in his address on .T uly 26, and the Secretary of State, at the treaty 
signing ceremony, declared that the treaty dealt with nuclear weapons 
testing and that it "will not restrict their use in time of war." The 
Secretary of Defense testified on this point as follows: 
I am quite familiar with the background tbat led to the introduction of the 
languag-e nnd it is clearly the intent of the l)Brties that the phrase would not 
apply to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapou;; in the e>ent of war. 
Parentht>ticallv. it should be noted that the Soviet Government has 
pnhlicl:v taken rl1e same view. A portion of its statement of August 21, 
issne<l in reply to a critical not£> of _\ ugust 1:) from the Communist 
Chinese GO\·ernment, said: 
The treaty, they say (the Communi t Chinese), does not prohibit the United 
Rtates of America from holding underground nuclear te!'lts, from increa,:;ing its 
!"tO<'kpile of nuclear weapons. 
But. first. the bands of the United States were not hound in tWs respect before 
thl' !'ligning of the treaty, and so nothing new bas occurred in this respect. 
~E:'<"Onrl. the trE:'aty also cloes not prohibit the Soviet Union, if need be, from 
holding unclerground nuclear tests. from increasing the stockpiles of it."! nuclear 
arm!.!, and e1en from using these weapons against the imperialillt aggressors if 
they unlE:'a,.:h •• wnr iu a flt or ln~anity. 
Ex. Rt.>pt. ~. 88- 1--2 
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The memorn,ndnm from thr Stnte DepnrtmPnt's Le.gal .\<lYiscr 
clearly establishc the limits of the treaty';:; SC'ope ancl its irrl'lcnmce 
I o ·wartime ronclit ions. 
The general counsel for the Department of Defense also testified on 
this qnestion, and obser\·ed: 
It i8 a commonly accepted rule of interpretation ln international law tbat pro-
vision;; of a treaty do not ll]Jply in time of war, or hostilitieli uuleHs lbe treaty 
c-learly indicates to lhnt eiTect. 
In the case of Teclzt v. lJ?Jghes, before the U.S. Conrt of ~\ppeals, 
1920, Judge Cardozo ruled: 
International law today does not preserve treaties or annul th<"m, regardless 
of the effects produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving 
or annulling as the necessities of war exact • • • 
Intention in such circumstances is clear • • • provisions compatible with a 
state of h ostilities, unless expressly terminated. ~·m be enforced, an1l those 
incompatible rejected. 
The Senate should be nssured that the committee, in recommend-
ing approval of this treaty, is entirely satisfied that the treaty in no 
wa,y impairs the authority and discretion of the Commander in Chief 
in time of crisis to employ whatever ·weapons he judges the siluation 
ma:v require, in nccorc1ance with our constitutional processes. 
ARTICLE II 
Article II provides an amending procedure. Any amendnwnt to 
the treaty must be approYed by a majority of the votes of all the 
partie..~, including the votes of each of the three ori~inn1 parties, the 
United States, Britnin, nncl the Soviet Union. .t\mendments n.re to 
have no force until instruments of ratification have been deposited by 
a majority, "including- the instruments oi ratification of all the original 
parties." This means that any amendment to the treaty must be sub-
mitted to the Senate and approYed before it can take efiect. The 
article provides that a conference may be calJed, if one-third 0f the 
parties so desires; however, the conference is not a nN·e:-;sary part of 
the amending procedure. 
ARTICLE m 
Article III sets forth the proeedures for ratification anc1 ac·('ession. 
The treaty is open to all states for signature, a.nd it is the hope of 
rhe United Stntes that the greatest possible number "·ill nclhere. SonlP 
concern arose as to whet her recognition mighl be accorded a regime 
thnt ob::::.erncl !he ac('ession procedure. East Germany, which has 
not been recognized as a soYereign state by certain sirnatories of the 
I reaty, was cited as a11 example. The Secretary of S'tate dealt with 
t hie; mutter in some detn il, declaring: 
In international law the> gon•rning criterion of r('eo~nlt iou i,.; int.eut. W I:' 
do not re,·oguize, anu we> do not intend to rec·ognizc, lhe ::;o,·i<'l m·entJation zone 
of Eu~t Germany a,.; a ~tate or HH an entity possessing nnlional sun·rdgnly. nr 
ro rec:o;mize the lot·al authorities a. ... a goYernment. Thtl:s{' authoritie,.; \'tlllU<~t 
ult cr the:;e fads hy the Hd of sulmcri!Ji ug to the test ban t rl'at~. 
,\Jl this would ue('es~arily follow from the general rulC' of internatinual lll\\' 
that pnrtiC'ipaliun in a wullilatPra.l treaty doe~ not affec·t the recognitiou ~o;tntuH 
nf any authorily or l'0!!;ime. But this treaty C'Ontains allditioual snf(•gua r<l . ;;. 
'l'n•a tie-s typieally provid<' for a single <leposit..'lry. ~\.rtirle 1 r r. lwwewr. provilh•c; 
that each of t!Je three nl'iginul partie;; will !Je a deJJnsitary of the tnuty. :\o 
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dt>positary need IH:cept a signature or an in~trumeut of a<·<·c~sion from aut huri-
tit•s iu a territory it doeJ< not reeo~rnize a~ a state. 
The East German authorities will ~ubserihe to tlw treaty in :\!<•,.,cow. The 
Stl\'it•t Cuicm may notify us of that act. We are under no obli;mtion to UtTept 
that notification, and we ban~ no intention of doin~r so. but tbt• East t~crman 
rt•;.duJ(• would have c·ommitted itself to auicle hy thP vrovisious of the treaty. 
Bv this arrangement. we not ouly assure tbut uo impliC'lltion of ret·o;mition 
IIIUY nrist>, but we r<"•crve our right to ohjt>ct if later tht> East nerman regime 
should SP!:'k to assN·t JH'i\"ilt'g-es \IJHI<'r tbe treaty sud1 as \'otinl-{ or parti<'il•Uting 
in u <."'n!crence call<•d un<ler article II. 
The Secretary's statement was fortified and rxpnnded in <tn opin-
ion of his Legal .Ach·isPr on this question fonnd on page Li of the 
printed hearings. 
.\RTICLE IV 
.\ny pa1iy can witlulnlw from the treaty "if it decide~ that extra-
ordinary en>nts, relat£>d to the ~ubject mattet· of this tr£>aty. have 
jPopartlized tl1e ~npreme iutere fs of its conlltry.~· This i~ a remark-
ably flexible provision. ~\.ceordingto Secretary of Defense )lcX~unara, 
tho original withdrnwal provision 3 was "modified specifica11y'" to take 
account of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Sta.:ff. 
S€'rretary of ~tatP Rusk emphasized, and the committee under-
stnnds, that the language of article IY is sufficirntly pen,1issin' to 
Pnabh• the rnited States to denounce and withdraw from the treaty 
whenevf'r its security interests might he ad,·erst'ly afl'ectecl by net ivities 
JWrtinent to the tre~tty. This nwans that i11 add!tion to possible viola-
tions hy the S(n·iel TTnion. the rnitNl States c•onld abrogate the 
IJ'Paty i'f nonsig-nntories, or P\' Pil 0ther sig-na.torirs, shonld trst rlan-
d£>st inrly or othPrwisr eng-ngr in nuclear <>xperiments dt>emNl pre-
ju<li<'ial (O e.~. IIHt ion a] S('C'IIl'it \" . 
. Secretat·y of Statt• H11~k ,,·as ll!-;ke<l whether the r11itecl State "·onld 
aetually lut''E' to wait for :3 months, the pre~crih<'cl withdrawal period, 
shotJld the SoYiet rnion abrogntP the tr('aty or <'Olllllle!Wt> te.:;ting in 
one of tht> prohihitt>d PnYironmenh. The ~C<'l"Ph\1'~' repliNl: 
ll is our view that we would not have to wait 90 days, beelu-·e the obligation 
nf the SoYiet t:nion not to test in the prohibited cnYironments is central to tbe 
\"NY purposes and existen<·e of this agreement, and it i~ el<>arly <•st~thli:;;bed through 
wecedent..s of Ame1·i<:an praC'ti<·e an<l international law over wnny decades that 
when· t be essential consideration in a treaty or agreement fails through viola-
tion on tlw other side that we ourselves arc freed from those limitntiom: * • • 
Whl're the g:nt of the treaty collap~es. we are not limited jn~t by the withdrawal 
da nsC'.' 
~\s a practical mutter, howeYer, the committee was told that with a. 
high statE' of rendineo::s, even the simplest nuclear test series requires 
~ months' prepnrntion, fl<:~,·elopment tests 3 months and efl'eds tests 
fi lllonths. 
ARTICLE Y 
Th;s art irlP proYiclPs I hnt thP treatv sh:1ll b~> deposited in the ;lrchi-ves 
of rarlt of thr f~m'P original parli<'< Tt hn~ bePn a~kNl "·hether as a. 
<lepo-..itary g"OYCI'l1lll<'11( thr rnitE'd St:lff'S mi~ht nec(>SSarily rommence 
h;n·ing !'Oilt:w·~ "'ith COlll11llll1;:-'l rp~.("imes like East nrrmnnv that 
"'onlcl :lll1"1111f to impliPd I'P('ognition. Thr fi1wl port ion of tlH' n'pinion 
3 SeP nrt. Jll of the Ausront 27 dralt treaty, app. No. 1. 
• The ~PCrPtnr;r's nt'w h• :.;opportt>d by an oplnlon of the Legal Adviser found oo p. 37 
nf !hP prlntt>d h!':tr!Dg!'. 
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of the Legal .\(h·i:-er of t!H• Del)artment of ~tate, refetTPd to earlier 
and found on page :ri of tlw prmted hearings, offers t"tc>a.ssurn.nce that 
the n•co~11ition question will not lw affected by this or auv pro\'ision of 
t lw rrea ty. This. inde('(l, is the committee's mHlerHtan<il ng. 
III. CO:\DUTTEE AC'flO!IO 
In addition to its oiH·ious political content7 the treaty bears heavily 
on military and tPrlm j,•ctl ctuest ions. For t hts reason, and because of 
its deep Significance, the chairman, aft.(>r consultation with ranking 
<·ommittee membPt's, invited the members of the Committee on Armed 
Serrices and Senate members of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy to sit jointly with the Committee on Foreign Relations during 
the hearinp; phase of consideration of the treaty. The two commit-
tees agree<1 to this procedure; th(' infonnation developed by the mem-
bers of each during the course of the hearings proviCled considerable 
~ruidance and assistance to tlw ('on1mittPe on Foreign Relations in 
evalua.ting the merits and the risks contained in the treaty. 
The committee was periodically consulted by the executive branch 
during the course of the negotiation of the treaty. Fo11r members of 
the Committee on Foreign Helar ions (Chairrnan Ft~lhri~ht, Senator 
Sparkman, Senator Humphrey, and Senator ~\iken). one member of 
the Committee on At·med. &>rviees (Senator Saltonst.all), and one mem-
ber of the .Toint f'ornmittee on _\tomic Ener~r:v (Senator Pastore) 
attendE'1l the Rigniug ceremoni£>s in MoS<"ow on .\Hgust n. Hl()!1. The 
treaty was tramm1ittNl to t lw SPrt~ ·- t ~· hy PresidE'nt Ke!lliNl[ on -\H!!USt 
R. 1!)6~. On August li. the committees began a sertes o pubhc ancl 
('xecutiw lwarin~ designed to t>xplore its pol it i<·al. military, nnd tech-
nolog;ical implieut ions as t hPy nn• YiPwe<l by t It(• 1110~t ('onqwtent wit-
nesses, official and nonofficial. 
The hearings '"ere completely bipartisan in spirit. }[embers were 
interested in exploring the prohablP effects of this trPaty on the na-
tional interests of the United States, nothing more. 
The committee soli<:ited the viPws of the three living cx-Presiclents. 
C n fortunately, President Hoover was prevented bv ill hoalt h from 
commenting. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, however, both 
transmittoo communieations that wpre very helpful to the ~·ommitteE>. 
President Eisenhower's letter to the chn.innan containE.'d a number of 
points that are reflected in the committee report. Specifically, his 
conc·crn over the implic·ations of the Jan~uage "or any other nuclear 
('Xplosion"' i::; dealL with at length in the discussion of article I. 
'\it h one except ion, all of the officin l n-itnesses supported the treaty. 
These included the Secr<'tary of State; the Sel'retary of Defense; the 
,Toint Chief~ of Staff and the Chairman of the .Toint Chiefs of Staff: 
the Director of tlw Central Intellig-ence _\gency: the f'hairtnan of the 
.Atomic Energy Commission; the Director of Defense Research and 
Engin<>ering for rhe Dep~ll"tlll('nt of Deft>nsc; the Technical Director 
of th(' _\.ir Force Tech.nH·al .\pplication Center; and the Director of 
the Los ~\ln.mos Scientific Laboratory. Dr .• Tohn Foster, Director of 
the Lawrence Radiation Lubomtory, was the Hole erit ic of the trea.tv 
among the official witue.-.~('S an<l n{ucle his case strictly on technicai-
mi1itnry grounds . 
. \.!so i1wited WPJ'e a nnmht·r of former Gowt·llnt<•nl officials, some 
of whom are .;;till rPtninecl hy tile Go,·ernm('nt as (·on:-:ultnnts. These 
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include: Mr. Arthur II. Dean, former U.S. representative to the Con-
ference of the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (1961) and 
to the 1 Nation Di armament Conference (1V62), and now a con-
sultant to the .Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) ; Dr. 
( ieorge B. IGst iakowsky, formerly special assistant to President Eisen-
hower for ~ience and technology, now a member of the .ACD.\.'s ( ien-
(•ral .\.dvi~ry Committee; Dr. '\Ti]Jard F. Libby. fonner member of 
the .\.tomic Energy Commission, now a to11su1tant to that agency: Dr. 
~larshall D. Shulman, former special assistant to the Secretary of 
State, now a consultant to that agency; Dr. Edward Teller, former 
Director of the Lawrence Hadiation Laboratory, now Chairnmn, Divi-
sional .\.dvisory Group of the .\.ir Force Bull] tic Systems Di ,·ision; 
IJr. Herbert F. York, former Director of the Lawrence Radiation 
Laboratory, a. former Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
of the Department of Defense, now a member of the ACDA's Oeneral 
.\(h·isory Committee. Of these, only Dr. Teller opposed the treaty . 
. \dm. L<•wi~ L. Strauss (retired). former Chairman of the Atomic 
En~.>r~ry Commission, testified against the treaty. Dr. Robert Strausz-
Hupc, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University 
of Pennsylvania, favored appro,-al of the treaty only with a number 
of reservations that he proposed. 
As is customary, the committee opened the hearings to public wit-
nesses submitting timely requests to appear. Twenty-five appeared, 
of whom a majonty supported the treaty. 
The burden of the committees' questions concerned the effects of 
the treaty on the present and future military balance of power. Some 
of these questions cannot be answered with precision; they involve a 
number of related subjects; they are answerable only in part and 
in terms of relative advanta_ges and disadvantages which are, them-
selves, determined by analySis of limited data and by extrapolations. 
Nevertheless, the committees did produce a record containing a large 
body of information, much of it new and only recently top secret, 
that should give reassurance to the American people that the treaty 
represents a net advantage to the United States; that the risks it 
contains are acceptable; that the nuclear strike forces of the United 
States are super1or in number and variety to those of the Soviet 
Union. 
MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER 
The Secretary of Defense, in a remarkably informative statement, 
told the committee that the United States has clear nuclear superiority 
and is determined to maintain it. He said : 
I regard as essential to our national security the maintenance of a military 
pn~ture such that we can absorb any initial surprise attack and strike back 
with sufficient power to destroy the aggressor. My assessment of the proposed 
treaty is made from that point of view-from the point of view of what is 
llest for the security of tlle United States. 
More specifically, the Secretary said that, in addition to SAC 
bombers on air alert and over 500 8 . .:\.C bombers on quick reaction alert 
(all bearing nuclear bombs) : 
'l'be U.S. force now contains more than 500 missiles-Atlas, Titan, Minuteman 
Polaris-and is planned to increase to over 1,700 by 1966. • • • By compari~ 
sou, the consensus is that today the Soviets could place less than half as many 
bombers over North America on a first strike; the Soviets are estimated to have 
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today t•uly a fraction as UlllllY ICIDI missiles; and their sub-Inmu·lwd ballistic 
mis."<iles an• ,;hurt range, retJUire sut'!ace launch, and generally an• not com-
parablP. to our l'olnril! force. BPtweeu now and 11JU6, it is el!tlmated that our bul-
listic mi,.sile uuruct·ical superiority will increase both nhsulutt>ly uud r~.>lntlvE>ly. 
Further. th£> Unitl·<l StntPs at prc,.;ent has in stockpile or pluurwd for st<l<·kpilt> 
a large nuuJber or nudt>lll' cxplosivt>s fur tadi<"al 1111rpo~·,;. 'l'h1•se wenpous 
art- pitUIU(•d for Ptnployml'lll on tlw bnttlclieltl. in nnti:<ubmuriue w.trfure. und 
aguin"'t aireraft; tlwy t•on,.;l,.;t of warlleads for artillery, llattlt>tlchl mi:;sih·s. 
demolition munitions, bombs. depth dmq~Ps, air-to-air unci surftH'P·Io-nir missilt•s. 
'l'lw ~-ieltl :-:pt•ctrum ns,.odated with these Wt•apons l'Xtends from the !-<llhkilott•n 
rnn:.:-e to lnmdn•ds of ldlotous. Tlw c·onst>HSH>-~ i-; that till' Unilt>tl Htutt•s is 
prP>-l('Uily supt>rior iu tJpsiA"Il, <livprsity, und numht•r:-. iu this PIUs!' of Wl'apoul'. 
Tllat is tlte Yt'ry getwral pictun•. It i,.; tht• 11idun• of existing uud t ·nntinnin~ 
U.S. uuelear ~uperiurity. 
The Joint Chief::; of :'t:tll' pre,Piltf>d a t'(llltl!iued :-;tall'lltl'llt, whiclt 
said: 
.\s to UPt sli!J£>riority in nbillty to lullid dallllll'P nn thP PIWlll~·. tlw .Joint l'hh•f,.. 
of ::-itniT <'llll:--itlt•t· that the lJnitPd ~·Hatt>s nt }lreseut is dearly ahead of lht• l'.~.:-\.H . 
in the nhility to wage strntt•gic unc!Par wnr. wlwrcas tlw Xovit•ts hun• ueveloped 
a sub~tnutialmidrunge-bullbti<·-mbsile capability. 
THE niSl\.S 
In n:>se:;:-.ing the balnrwe of technical <UHl111ilitary risk::; of the treaty. 
th<> conuuittl·~ ~ought to compare the teehnologicaJ as well as the mili-
tary capabilities of the rnited States and the ~o\·iet Union. The 
priucipal witnesses appcarP<l to be unanimously agreed that in terms 
of yield-to-·weig:ht ra.tios, one of the important criteria in determining 
the delin•rabiltty of nw·l<>ar wenpons, the So\·iet Union is superior 
in the high-yield rangl"-roughly 10 megatons ttnd abo\'e. Below 
that leYel, as Secretary ~IcNama.ra testified: 
The relath·e <'apal.lility ~hifts progresl'lively in favor of tbe l'nitl'd States. 
Bl'low a few megatous, the L'nlte<l States &fll)(~ars tu be dearly superior iu 
yield-to-weight ratios. 
The committee was told that, although the United Statt>s conlcl 
improve its yield-to-weight ratio::; for very large yield \Wapons with 
atmospheric testing: it could, without any furtl1er t<>:::ting, d<>velop a 
50- to 60-megaton warhead for B-.-~~ delivery. HowH<>r, the prin-
cipal mil it. try and scientifie witnesses all teiH.lNl to Illinimi7.E> the im-
portnw·" of the Soviet advanta~e in this area, ancl to assig-n vt>ry little 
military value to these extremely large weapons. The United States 
could have developed such ,.,.·eapons, but for many yeRrs has con-
sistently chosen not to do so, to concentrate instead ou the more useful 
and deliverable low- and intermediate-yield weapons. 
Tllis decision has accouutefl in large part for the ~uperiority of the 
U.S. forces. As Secretary of Defense ~fcXamnra stated: 
Our high yield-to-weight ratio in the relevant rauge ha~ fndlltatNI the de,·elop-
ment of more powerful warheads for Minuteman and Polaris without concomi-
tant increase in vehicle size or d•>Crense in range. It is be<'llll~e of t.llis that tlw 
United States baH bad the advantage over the :'\oviets or lM·ing able- to dE>plf'Y 
large numbers or hardened and dispersed Minuteman missile-s and a large num-
ber of long-rnuge, sub-lnunched Polaris missiles. Anti U.R SUJI£>riority In the-
lower rauge-s fncllitates further development of relatively !I mall wn rbf'ads whi<'b 
would be used to assure penetration by saturation ot sopblt~ticated and very 
elaborate ballistic missile defenses. 
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En•11 l>r. Ed\\urd Teller, a ~.:riti<.:of tltr· treat~·, l'CI'l'Illly L:<JIUHH!llled: 
It b not ("[t_o;u· to me that tbe~e \'ery ui~ yielu;: will result in a sub~tantial 
adnwtag-c· for tL£· Hu~"'ians • • •. In e'l"aluating tllc eon~equence · of tbe te:-;t 
han, I do not pla~:e very great importance on the lt:ad wbkh the Hussian~ eujoy 
i 11 t IIi" particular field. 
The Joint Chief;-; of Stafl' testified that they-
han• nnt rp;.;ardPcl as i;uportant the attainment of wt:apuns iu tbe 100 megaton 
ran~t· • • •. Tlwy feel that the types and number::; of megaton-yield weapons 
available tons nc,w nr iu the future <·uuld give us an adequate ca1mbility in the 
hi;.\'h-yiPld WP:tJion run~e. 
_\JHl the Cltairman of the .fojnt Chiefs o.f Statl', in response to a 
direct qnt>:-,tiun on this point. replied: 
I at tac·h \'l'l'Y little> importanl'e to this, frankly, :-;cnator. 'fhe whole Ycry-lligll-
yil'!cl W(:>apons field is one wllich has n~ry little, if any, military significance. 
It i:s peilHtps releYant to obseiTe that a 1-lllegaton weapon provides 
i)t 1 time:.; the explosi ,.c power of the 20-kiloton ''Hiroshima'' bomb; a 
lOU-megaton weapon would provide 5,000 times that explosive power. 
Of more intPrest to the committee were three other questions that 
do bear 011 the present and future strategic bahnc:e. These are the 
pcnetrat ion tapability of missiles: :mti-bnllistie-mi.,sile development: 
tlto sw·yi,·al ('apubtlity of mi:-.sile sites and systems. Furthemwre, 
till'S!' <lm·:-;tiom; are themselYes infinenc:ed by atmospheric ph~nomena, 
sueh as conmnmicat ions and raclnr '·blackout," i\·luch a l"e taused bY 
nuclear IJla~t ancl radiation anu ·which could exercise son1e eil'ect oi1 
both oll'c'u"i'e and defensiYe nuclear weapons. 
In ccmsidering suc.;h questions, both in comparative and real terms, 
tlw committee was presented with a. great deal of hiahly technical 
testimony, so1ne of it sharpl:y cou{Licting. For example, t\YO distin-
guished seieuti:sts challenged the testimony of a number of other dis-
tin).ruislted l:>cielltists. It was necessary for the committee to bear in 
mind tLat some witnesses had the adnmtage of possessing all of the 
relevant information-tedmical and military information, together 
with intelligence. The:se "·itnesscs who ·were able to discuss the ques-
tions again:-;t :-,O Lrottd a background included the Secretaries of State 
ancl Defense: the Director of the Central In telligence ~\gency: the 
Clmirman of the Atomic Energy Commission; the Joint Chiefs of 
::-;ta1l': ancl the J)irector of Defei l:-.e Research and Engineering o£ the 
Department of Dcfcn:-,e. Each of these witnesses, as indicated, . up-
ported the treaty. 
Jl i:·adle JH'ncfmtion capability 
The committee is contident that the trealy poses no serious risk 
to the continued capability of r.s. missiles to penetrate any defensive 
system that a potential adversary might reasonably be expected to 
deploy. In nuclear ·weapons de"i·elopment, offensive capabilities, ac-
cording to Yirrually every competent scientific witness, will ahntys 
range far ahead of defensive capabilities. Dr. York Wlderlined this 
point succinctly : 
I do not ~ny. or uelieve, tllat there will be no progress in idea~:~ or techniques 
in the held of an! i-hallistic-missile development. I a.m in fact optimistic, tech-
nically sveakiu~. vdth regard to what human imagination and ingenuity (•an 
accomplish, in this area as in others. llo\vever, I am very much more optiiUi.;tic 
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with regard to what human ingenuity can accomplish in the way of det:Jiguiug 
hallistic missiles which can easily beat or penetrate any ballistic missile !!ystew. 
The race between offense and defense is a race between a tortoi~e and a hare 
and it only the bare does not go to sleep, the tortoise bas no chance. 
Penetration capability depends largely on saturation and includes 
such techniques as multiple warheads, varied trajectories, the use of 
heavy and lio-ht decoys, barrage, salvos, and so forth. 
It is conce~ed that atmospheric testing could provide additional 
useful knowledge regarding the effects of blast and radiation on nu-
clear warheads and reentry vehicles. However, the limitation on 
aaining further knowledge will inhibit both the United States and 
the Soviet 'Cnion equally, although probably not seriously in either 
case. It is believed that the laboratories on either l"ide will be al>le to 
compensate for uncertaintjes by extrapolatinp: and "desip:ning around 
them." Secretary of Defense MeN amara had this to say: 
• • • regardless of the design of any Soviet AB~! Rystcm, in >iew of wurhe1Hl 
improvements we can make under the treaty, of the rnas~ive (;.S. forc·c UYailabh• 
to saturate their defenses, and of the array of penetration aids whi<:h ar<' being 
de,·eloped and can continue to be developed and improved, by undt>rgrouud 
testing where necessary, the United States will <:ontinue to have the capability-
and the Soviets know that we will continue to have the capability-to penetrate 
and to devastate the Soviet Union if a retaliatory blow i~ required. 
Anti-balli8tic-missile (ABM) de1Jeloprnent 
The committee took cxtensiYe testimony on the ant i-bnllistic-missile 
question. From this it has concluded that the treaty should not re-
strict-not, to any appreciable degree-the development of such a sys-
tem, if, indeed, an anti-ballistic-missile system can be developed w1th 
sufficient effectiveness to justify the enormous cost of deploying it. 
The United States has a number of nuclear warheads of suitable design 
and performn,nce for anti-ballistic-missile systems under development. 
Still others of larger yield can be developed underground. How-
e,·er, the development of a high performance ABM system is a com-
posite of staggering teclmical problems, largely unrelated to the war-
head, a relatively simple and manageable part of the whole system. 
In essence, the problem, again, turns on the great disparity between 
offensive and defensive capabilities in the nuclear art. .\s was fre-
quently observed during the hearings, interception and penetration 
are opposite sides of the same coin. Secretary of Defense MeN amara 
said this in describing the problem : 
An ABM system consists of several types of radars, the interceptor missile aud 
the very complex computing equipment at a ground station to control the radars 
and to direct the interceptor missile. The various radars serve to detect incoming 
objects in nearby space, to track the incoming warhead, and to track and eontrol 
the interceptor missile, " ;hich is targeted on the incoming warhead hy the com-
puting equi})ment. 
In designing an antiballistic missile system the major factors are reaction 
speed, missile performance, traffic handling capacity, capacity for de<·o)· diR-
crimination, resistance to blackout effects, and warhead technology. The lal:'t 
~wo of these items, resistance to blackout etl.'ect and warhead technology, depend 
on nuclear testing. 
With respect to warhead technology, the lJnited States now bas the capubllity, 
without further testing to weaponize a variety of possible AB~r wnrht>ads, in-
dueling those within the yield range deHired by the designers of wh11t i!-1 known ns 
our Nike-X system. • • • As for the blackout problem • • • So,·iet and l.JnitE'd 
States experience appears to be comparable a lthough obtained in different ways. 
Each f'ide bas bad about the same number of high altitude tests, :mel ov<-r yiE>ld 
ranges and nltitucle ranges which are compnrable though not illPntic·al. By 
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tlu·oretleal tlll:tl.1~i ... uf }ll'l':<l'lltl~· UI'UilaiJI<- dntn. \II' bclil'll' \It' t';lll adt'<tll:tll'l~· 
prt"flkt etfe<•t:< 0\' 1'1' tlw rnnc:P of yit>ltl"' a!lll altitudt•..: in wlt!t-h \\' t• art' 1111"1 inter-
1'1-'lt•ll. We will lot• uhl<· to th•,.l; .. m 11round thl' I'l'llllliuiu;.r llll!'t•rt aiut i<·"· 
Tlw hest pre1-'l'llt jndl!tllent i-: tltal our dPsi,eu pfi'mts nn• l'fltllparahlc· iu nuu.:ni-
IIH11' atlCl !-lll<'t 'l'~"' with thost• rof the' Rm·ipt..:. .\ny <lt•plo~·pfl sy:<tl'lll whi<·h Ill!' 
~m·ipts llrP likt•ly to han• in the neur futu1·e will Jll'Ohllhly not ht• as t>fl'!·c•til·t· . 
almo..:t certainly unt uton· <>fTectiYP, than the X1k<>-Zeu" s~·st<>m. It l-'iwulll be 
not,.,J that the United Stat<'" de<~idPtl not to rl~:>JJioy tbe Xlke-Z<'tls hN•ans<• its 
etredivene~;~ was inndequate. 
OnP important point ;;(antis ont ill l'ollnt•<·t iou with lht• aulil~:tllbtit· nti,.,.ilt•: 
1'hf' .\Bli problem b dominat<'<1 hy f:tdors unrt•latt-d to tlw tr<>aty $ '" e .• \fuller 
underRtandln~ of the blackont phenomenon, wbich would ,·esul t from lt>ats pro-
hlblted by the trNlty, mi~bt at lllOst pE>nuit l':ome reduction in the numbt•r of ABM 
rndnr~ required pc>r ABll sitt'. 
The Se<"r<•tnry underlinPd the...;e point~ <lm·ing a. ]pngthy discu::;sion 
of the _\B~I probh.'llJ. He indicated th11l the Department of Defense 
is seeking $450 million for furt.her research and dcYelopment on both 
the Nike-Zeus and Nikc-X ABM systems, and added: 
nut whctlwr tlwse 1lcn•!opment expenclitures nntl JH'O~r;tms will lt>ad to u l'l-'<!-
ouunpucla tlon for d£>plnyment I en n 't ,..:ay. nut 1 hi' clPt·i "'ion " ill not d c.'JWII<l upon 
further t~ts of tlw warhead. 
This judlrrnrnf wn...; c·onlirlltt'Cl l•y Dr. ~c·abnrg:. C'Jwirman of the 
~\tomic Energy Commission. 
The Secretary was then asked: "Can you tt>:;t the system and deter-
mine that it will work without ntmosphE'ric te~ting?'' He replied: 
'l'hr• nnswt•1· i:-; oh,·iou,..:l\' no, ht'{'Ull~t> 111 t'""' tlw ,:y,.; ( t•m a full seall' s:>,..:tt'llt lest 
uu•nn,..:. fiJr I'Xlllllph•, nu ·H'IDl wnrht•;lll mu,..:t hP htunchc>d O\'f'r n cl.istnuee of 
4,000 or· :J.CKIO milPs uurl detonnted in tlw JH'esPII<'P of the .\lnl :-;y,..:t<'lll to <'l'<?:tte 
hl:wkout, nnd 111<'11 the.' in ter('£>J)tm· mis:si lc- mu"t he 1l!'f on a h•cl in the Jlrox i mit y of 
:uwthPt' ilH:oming ICB:\L Quite clearly that k inll of o1 te~t cnnnot ht• c·arrled 
CJUI nnder the tt·l·ms of the treaty. BulHc>ilh<'l' i!'; that l\.i11d of tP~t IIE'Ct''<!';flry to 
rt'nC'h n rt>n~mNl c·onclusion that We.' should or should not deploy sue,h a syst<'IU. 
The chief critics of the treaty amo11g scientists were Dr. Foster and 
Dr. Teller. Neither appeared to be convinced that further 1mr'-'Stricted 
testing would guarantee or necessarily promote sign inc·nnt pro~rre~s in 
ABM development. Dr. Foster commented: 
Ht•;.:ardin~ dt'ft•u,.;t>. onE' of the crllit-<ll quPstions couct'ms the E"1fe<:t of blackout 
fl'oln clc-fPnding- mi:-;~ll<•s on Ute defense itRelf. Ruppose that the attnck is so hE:'uvy 
that tlw flpfpust• clPtnnntion!'; themsei'I"E'S s<-re<>n n wirlf' 111'<':1 of spnce from radar 
"it>\\' 
To some c.'Xlt'lll. I hi;; ohstrndiou to radar 1 1<•11 c·n11 lw t•i r tll lllH' III t>d h_,. dPJlloy-
in~ 11 :-;ufficlent unmlu•r of radars. nut UH•r<• are two poiul,.; here '"hidt must 
not he• O'l"crlook<'<l. Tht• first is that the ultilll:tl c dC'C'ision whelht•r ur Hot to d e-
plo,v an AID! systclll may wt•ll dcp<•tt<l upon jus( how t•xpt·JI,..:in~ the ~~·:-;(cw io.; i11 
relation to its effccti I'Pnes!'l. 
Therefore. to ~ny tltat blackout c·;m '-'" a ,·oidt•<l siluply I'-" ! hP i 11;.1 a II at io11 of 
additional radars in'l"olves far more than n casual stntem<>n!. 
Til<• ;;pcond {JOint i~ tbat e\'£m if ,..:uch tl ~olntion \Y<'rc tcl'lnli<·nll,v ft•n sihlf'. it 
is not t'uou~h just to h«" aiJI<' to ~tUtl' t hr> t'OI'l't•c·t in' mC<tsnrP: IY(' Hlll!-'t al~o d o it . 
• \u nlterm1th·<• solution wbiC'h mi!::'ht c·omp<"le fn,·omiJIY fr·om n11 t•t·onmnk 
,·iew mi~ht he to !len!IOll a new t:qle of .\TL\l wm·h e<Hl ll<'si;..:-nNl to furtht•r n•dtwe 
bhH·Iwut. ~uitalllt• warhe:hb to try ou t c·oul cl bf' dPI'PlopC"cl in nudc•n:Ttnuul 
tP:-ts . UndPr thP trent~·. hmll'l'l'r , lht' c·rur·inl ntmn"phcr it· 1<''-'!s ,, rntlrl hP pro-
hiltitPcl :lllrl we wonlcl hf' <l<'lli<"<l lh<' t·nnfinnntion nf this solnt ion . 
. \ nd D r. TPilr r. in rC'ply to a 'I'IC'..,i ion , ..;:I id: 
Tlll'rc• i ... onH• typc> of tc-:; r about whic-l1 1 nm Jtltlsl \\ orril'd, nltl~t•ll:.:h a.~ai11 it i" 
lut :-<t•cl on Jllll'P "l"'<"HI:tt ion. It wonl<l Llt' \\'OJHh•rful i f \l'f' <·oultl in-;tnll a wi..,,..:ile 
ll<'ff'll'-''' -<y-:lt'lll whi<-h illfPI'I'PJifs thl' iiii'()Jllin:::- mi'-'-:ill' hPforP it hn..: eu•n l't'HI'ilr-<1 
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our ~lwrcs. This llll':.lll,., 11 P han· to iutt-n·<·pl llll' 1ui~~ilt- illlll.'tll' "'IJ:lct•, iu a rt'J.,:'iou 
wllcrc t h\•re is no fl tmo~plwn•. '.flll't'P is no 8Ysl eru vropo~P<l at tlw prt>;;Pnt time 
wl1icb is ren.llr ltuvt'ful, Whi<'h look~ ~·)()(1, nnd which 'H' ca11 count upon in this 
end. Then• mig-llt lit• slwh a JIOs'<iiJilify. If so, it has to he testl'd in ~IlUCe 
""nnH.'\Yhl're. 
The cmlmJittt•e \\1\:-: itll}Jt'l':-o:-Nl bv this commt>nt fnn11 Dr. Kistia-
kowsky: · 
TH·fore J(•a\·ing llw .\B:\1 prolJlclll, wbh:lt secws to be )Jt•rhaps the issue of 
.~rPalest ('Onc:ern to lhost' who fJil<.'.Sliou the wisclom of the trPnty, I would like 
to Jlllnke one other obserration. I tun not reall,v iutimall'ly familiar with this 
important problem in all its tcehnicul details. Neither have ucen most of the 
oll.Jct· witnE>sses who h<l\'l' IJCl'n Jwnnl. I would, therp.fore, urge thtlt the com-
miltee give special weight lo the teKtimony of llnrold Brown, wbo to my knowl-
Nlgl• i:-; lhc oul.> wi tuc ·s so f:ll' bea1·,1 who can speak with real authority regurd-
iug the totaL _ill)l prohleru, and tbc related de,·eloprnents in ofi'cnsh'e ::~ystems. 
Jle ha,.; access to all of tlle inlclli~l'O<·e regarding So,·ict ac:tlvitit:'s and all of the 
Pxpertise in the United State::; on our <·npnuili ties lbat rcln te to the problem. 
Basc<l on my own lruowlNlge I believe H >ery likely that the ofl'Pnse has now, 
aud with enm only modem lP t•liorls lo rouuter .AB)l clevelOJlll1ent, will continue 
to have, a <:Oiumnmling lcn1l over lllt' <.lefensc for as far into the future as we 
can foresee. 
Dr. Rro"·n's JliO~t pl·rt in0nt I'Omment on 4\.B.\[ de,·elopment is as 
foUows: 
~ * * the best pr('scnt judgment is that our AB~I <levelopu~~omt efforts are 
comparable in magnitude and succe::~s with those of the Soviets. Any deployed 
system which the Soviet~:; are likely to have now or in the ncar f11ture does not 
appear to be as e1Ieetive, almost certainly not more eJTe<>ti\'e than Nike-Zeus. 
The United States deciclefl not to <leploy t.he Nike-Zeus because its effectiveness 
was inadequate against U.S. penetration aids programed for entry Into the U.S. 
inventory before a Nike-Zeus system could be deployed. U.S. penetration aids 
now under development will be effective against much more sophisticated 
l"ystems. 
In response to a. question from the chairman o£ the Foreign Rela-
t:ions Committee, Dr. Brown expanded on this point.: 
I think we are roughly comparable (tbe United States and U.S.S.R.). If I 
were forced to say one si<le or the other is ahead on knowledge, I would say that 
we were, but I don't think that is a very firm statement on my part. 
A better judgment, I think, is that we nre about equal • • *. The Soviets 
have said that they hn ,-e intercepted a missile with a missile. 'Ve have inter-
cepted a missile with a missile on l!Umerous occasions. The Soviets hnve not 
said-and on my exumination of all Ute available evidence I IJelieve tllat they 
have not intercepted a missile with a missile at ICBM rang-es, that i5 at ranges 
of mtwy tltonsands, several thousnnd miles, 4,000 miles or more. It is not a t1rm 
C"ouf'lns ion !Jut it h; what I bl'licve. 1Ve have intercepted a missile at ICB~I 
ranges. at our test site at Kwnjalein. 
~t'COncl, t be Soviets hoxe uol said that they have interccplecl a missile with 
an interceptor carrying- an CXJllOcling nuclear '"arhen.d. A::;-uin, on investi"ntion 
of lhe relevant fact;;, I conclude that they have not. We bO.\'e not, Pither, and 
I (·ondudc from that that neiliH'r we nor thE:'y ferl thtlt is the most Yillll part of 
au au timi~:;ile <le\'elopiuenl. 
The committee is douulfullhat either the G11ited Stutes or the SoYicl 
'lnion will develop an ~\JU[ system capable of protecting major popu-
lal ion ...:enters and military targets in a generalnudPar exchange. Yet 
the import.mce of the pro!;ram i~ surh that the committt•e can only 
urge that the research aw1 devrlopment funds refptnled as 11eeessary 
for this program should be made available. Indeed, npart from their 
defensive purposes, efiicient antiballistic missile systems, as Dr. York 
and others observed, perform a critically important function in test-
ing the reliability of penetration aids for oftensive missiles. But in 
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auy caste', after <·on~idering all of lhe t(•-.t imnuy on this ::.nbj(~Cl. the 
rommittoo agree.::; with the ,Joint Chief~ of Staff that "in tho antibnl-
list ic mis.sile. fie1d, <1He1opnwnl of the P .S. ~y::;tem do<-s 11ot dept'ml on 
at mo..;pJwric t e~t ing * * * :~ 
/:'If,,.,,.. of hul11n r/ ph' 11 o 1111 1111 o 11 llt/(·h 11 r II'( opo "" 
('oJH'('l'll was (':\jH't'"~l'<l that tiH' r11ited ~f!lt<'S might hun• iu-
sii1Jil·iPilf knmYIPd~<· ahont tlw pfl'pds of inclu<:ed phenouwna on its 
lltii'IPar \H':t}>OJI-.. and Jllig-ht Pn·n hnn· dropped hPhincl flH' Sm iPt 
I '11ion inthisai'P:t. J)r. Fo~fl'I'!'OiliiiH'III!'<l: 
:\I issilf' sy;o;((•UJs for otrPIJsP or tl<'fPilse an• t>XIt'C'rn<•ly ('Olll!Jl<'x, yt•l Jlllh .. t fun•·-
1 inu 1111t 11111~· nn1lf'r thf' id<>ul lnhorator~· t·otH1itions in whi<'h th<>~· :u·p uc;uully 
tl'slt·d. hut aJ-.o uu1l!'r the most 111ln•rsc eondit ions- -tho~c of 11\t<:h•m· war. 
I Imow or -.impler l'lysterus whic·b have not performed ns expel"lcd-nr which 
have actually failed-when prnnf ft>st<'d in em·ironmf'nls whh·b nrc far hettcr 
understood than that of a hostile mwlcar l'it nation. 
Technical }leople have bnd this experience not once hut ma11y tiuws. '!'bat 
the exact nuclear environnwnt for mif;silcs. mic;~ile ~it<'l', and rceutry >chic:l!'s 
I'robably 1·annot be c·ou•vletely duplicated even without I reaty restrictions is 
not nn argument for no atmospheric tests whateV"er. We ran ohtniu a mnch 
hettPr understanding of the situation with nuclear experimt>uts in thf' atmol'phere 
than without them. 
"\Y.ith regard to So,·ict lmmdc<lg<> in this Iit>ld, Dr. Fo,.;tpr sni<l: 
When the Soviets resumed, it. surprised us. It surpri~cd us uecausc !bey 
were testing at a great ratP, and testing at a ~?;reat rate implies not so murh 
that you are geared up for it, that ~·ou can handle tile flow of the d<'signs into 
hardware and into stock, into the aircraft, whatever it is. missiles. 'L'his tnke:; 
a bit of depth and width in a te~t program. 
In addition, the experiments that arc so frequently referred to l1aving to do 
with missiles and radar, and ~o on, were just very extensive, and t be unmis-
takable conclusion you come to is that the Soviets had a •ery definitC' objective 
in mind. 
The United States, on the other hand, I would say, conducted some very in-
teresting scientific probes into the phenomenology of nuclear effects. 
Now whether or not one approach or the other is of overriding importnn<'c I 
honestly do not know. 
His colleague, Dr. Bradbury, in responding to a, <1nestion on tl1C' 
relative degree of Soviet knowledge of nuclear weapons effects, took 
a somewhat uifl'crent ,·iew: 
My impression is * * • that these tests have been condueled under cireum-
stances that make it seem 1-;omewhat unlikely that the Russians hnYc arquir<'d 
u very great deal of complicated technical information. 
As you are aware, our experiments over the years in Bikini, Christmas, 
and Johnston Islands are extremely complicated experimental diagnostic ovcra· 
tions on which a great deal of effort is ~pent to maximize the amount of scien· 
t iflc information that we get. 
I am 110t aware that the Hussiau~ have conducted ·imilar types of Ollerations 
ex<·epl. in one instan<·e where I have heard that they bad curried ont a fairly 
-.ophistieatcd type of operation. 
The best qualified witness on thi::; question. in terms of the lltlture 
and diversity of information crossing his desk, togelhe.r with the tech-
nical competence to C\'almte ::,uch information, was Dr. Bro\vn. He 
told the committee: 
'Yith respect to high-altituue tests carried out for the vnrpose of dctt-rmining 
I he effPcts of nuclrar burst,; 011 commnuit'at ions l.Jlackuut, rarlar lrlnr•l\<>Ut, ancl 
uu(')ear weapon-. \"nlnerahil ity, Rovkt and Uuited ::H<ll(•s ~''l'C!l"ii'IH.'P :lJIJit•nr..: 111 
he coruparable. Each side has had ahout the same nnmbC'r of t<':-.ts, oq•r :\icld 
ranp;es an<! altit ucic ran~es which are comparaLl<' thou~h rwt idt•rllit•al. Euou~h 
ha~ been lParne<l in the United ~f:lte:-:: to verify the existenrt', nnt nrf', :md rou<::h 
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dcp• lJIIl•III'P of bhtcl~out dJarttcterb:til::-: on yil•ltl aud allitutle. altlwugh hupc>rtaut 
cll"tail~ still hnn· not been t'xplort'<l. Tlu• ::-::uut• is (lrohahl~· true iu tht- ~m·it.>t 
Uuiou. l'roltahly ncitht•r side undt·r::tan<l!-1 the phenomena ~c~utlldeutly W(•ll to 
{l('rmit tlll•·orPtic-;tl l'Xten~ion with ("OlllJlll'tc c·oull<lt•JH·l• to :-olll(' uther nltitmh•::, 
yields, and t_nl(.•s or lll•Yic<•s: but we ha vt', and pt'l•smuahly tht• ~ovlets also han•. 
NJ•Ingh information to l'llllhic us to tnke steps to t!(.,..ign uronud our tlll('ertalnti~. 
Dr. Brown was nsked to comment on tlte upi11io11 of tlw .Joint ('hi~f~ 
of Staff that "the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the Fnite<l States * * * in 
weapons effects knowledge derived from high-yi('l<l mwlPnr t.•xplo-
sions • • *." 
Dr. Brown disagreed with this view, responding: 
That, h~· the way, l c·on:--lcler not n military questluu lmt. a l!"(;huical tlllt't'tiou. 
null my interpretation or ali the datu, and it i~ avnllahle to the Chiefs as well a11 
to me, in!li<'llt(•s tit at ultlwugb they have donE.' nwre hi~:h-yleld tt-st~ those wert-
not eiTed:s tP~t..... Their ~eogrHJJby, and the ns,-u<'i:tf('tl :1\'tlvlty, tlot•s not lntll('ate 
to me that I bey nrc effect" tetit>~. 
With rt>,.pcct to hi~:h-altltudt• bluckont, the Chiefs ~ny the ~~~\·it·ts mny haw 
some datn that we do not have. I would 8ay "Yt.•s, and we hnve 11nme data that 
tbP~' mny not hnve" • (I • of those hundred ( 81wlet) tel-Its oul~· n \'ery small 
nnruher wen· at :til ilutles wbcr·e the firebnll bl:u·kout anti ~' on are impnrtnnt. 
I think that we lun·e also had many, many tt-sts nml Wl' bu n•n't tlunl' hln('knnt 
CXJICrimcn t s exct•pt on n ft-w of the high-all It mlc ones, ei tlwr • • •. 
But I thluk that the I.'Vldence is very "tron)! frmu gengl'llphlt·al positioll, :lllcl 
the a>:sod:ttt .. l fadlilff•s, thnt thPSe Wet'(' not l:'tft"<·ts t<•sts f"XC'('(If for thl' few thnt 
I 01entloned. 
Dr. Brown was subsequently asked whether our defensive radar 
would be operative after an initial large nuclear hlnst. He replied 
affirmatively, saying: 
* .. • wt' bnvc don~> the experiments both in w;;~ and ngnln in lOO'.l. That 
is whl're we leurnNl about this phenomenon (blackout), nnd the systems 
that we urc htlklng about are desiguNl to ~unive in such n situation. to deploy 
:ldditioll:tl rn1lnrs, to be able to !-11?1?, to allow for tbi!'l blnc•kout. 
We must • • • ''-'h<'ther we know about it or not, de~lgn nround the proh-
lcm b('cause • Jl< • a hlg enough fireball cannot be seen through: you cannot 
muke a radar that will see through it. That meum; you havt• to take other 
measures, and we nrc taking those other mNt~un•-:, having learned enough 
about hlackout from the previous tests to take these other lll('asure~. 
Tbf' more we teamed about It, tbe better we could do. Rut I want to make 
the point tbnt this Is a usC'!ul, but not n vital. nddltionnl pi<~<'f' of ln1'ormatlon. 
Dr. Brown\ an<l Dr. Bradbury's testimony was consistent with 
that of Secretary of Defcns(' ~IcNamara an(l O('nernl Taylor; the 
lnttPr had this comment: 
• • · \\-l' know qultt• a bit about thl.' gPtH•t·aJ ph<•Jtntlli'JIOio~y of lll:u·kc•nt 
ciTl·c·t:-; fmm our own ft•:-:tiug. I think that nil or our extlertH would say, how-
Pn·r·, \H' ('(•t·taiul~· clo not know ev«.>rything, und we wnulllllke to know more. 
IJowt•vcr. wit It regard to the immediate problt•ms or the weapons system~ 
wt• an• coutemplutlng, the general opinion is that Wl' ('ltD nttaln these weapon!: 
en·n with the pr1•sent url<'ertniuties about thl~ purti1•ular phenomenmr. 
In this same context, Dr. Bro·wn was a~ked to compare the number 
of atmospheric tests conducted by the Fnited States with the number 
conducted by the Soviet Union. He rep1i('d thn.t "we have had of 
the order of 200 atmospheric tests and the Soviets han~ hnd of tlw 
order of 180." He also stated that in the pnst 2 years, "we ha vc 
had something over 130 atmospheric and unrl<'rgt·mmd [testsl ns f'Ollt -
pared to somet~ like 160 in the 13 years before that." 
The Soviet Umon has, of course, clone wry littl(' t<'SI ing- ttn<lPt· -
ground. 
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The committee, after considering the testimony of Dr. Brown and 
other competent witues:;es, has concluded that the inhibition on gain-
ing further knowledge of etfects on nuclear weapons through testing 
in the upper atmosphere, although perhaps the most seriou::; inhibi-
tion imposed by the treaty, is an acceptable one; that it will not 
seriously deter the united 'tates in developing and maintaining mis-
sile systems that are capable of performing the functions for which 
they are deployed . 
. ·urvival capability of missile sites 
The committee is confident that the second-strike capability of G.S. 
::.trategic forces could SUITiYe an all-out Soviet nuclear strike. Both 
Secretary of Defense McX amara and Dr. Brown testified at some 
length on this question. The Secretary said: 
Tllo l'.S. strate&ric missile force is designed to survive and it will survive. 
Our mi~:~sile force is deployed so as to assure that under any conceivaule Soviet 
first strike, a BUbstantial portion of it would remain in firing conditon. Most 
of the land-based portion of the force has IJeen hardened, as well a · rlispersed. 
:\llnuteman silos are designed to withstand thermal and pressure effects and 
ground motion effects of typical Soviet weapons detonated at relatively close 
quarters. 
The Minuteman control posts are protected by extreme hardening. In audi-
tion, we have duplicative facilities which will in the future include the capabil-
ity of launching each individual Minuteman by a signal from airborne eontrol 
post.". 
Large--yield nuclear tests in the atmosphere on or near the ground would help 
us to determine with greater predsion the degree of hardness of our Minuteman 
~>ilO!:l. However, we believe the Soviets have conducted no such tests. We tan 
achfeYe, by underground tests of substantial yields, a significant reduction in 
C'E'rtain exiRting un<·ertainties. And, it must ue remembered that the United 
States has already bad considerable experience with low-yield surface lllld near-
surface detonations whic•b have ucen used to study the effects of surface Imrsts 
on hardened structure~'~ such as the Minuteman silo~;. 
The Secretary also said that command and control posts can be 
constructed at sufficiently great depths '•to preclude their destruction 
e\·en by surface detonation of 100-megaton bombs." He added that 
tho Yu..lnerability of such posts is reduced by the use of alternate, 
airborne systems already in operation. 
The effects of surface uursts on hardened structures such as mi~:>sile sites 
llave ueen studied in the United States by means of several low-yield explo;:ions. 
Such low-yield explosions lluve also taken place in the Soviet "Gnion. We ha•e 
only limited knowledge about the nature of their in~trumentation, but there 
appear to have been some heavily instrumented shots, though perhaps not as 
heavily instrumented as the most elaborate U.S. tests of this kind • • •. 
In any case the vulnerability of hard missile ·ites is even more sensith·e to 
missile accuracy than to yield, and both of the!ie will always be rather uncertain 
with respect to the future threat. The SE'paralion and numbers of our projected 
:\finutemn.n force, in addition to their hardening, certainly provide aclequate 
margin against these uncertainties as well as the uncertainty in the vreci)';e dis-
tnnce at which a given yield can destroy a given site. 
Dr. Brown was asked whether in his opinion the purpose of the 
Soviet tests of nry-hi~h-yield weapons was to test the vulnerability 
of hardened sites. lie replied that he was "quite sure that they did 
!lot use ~h.at test to test hard sites.'' lie observed that ''the geograph-
lcal pos1t10n and its altitude and the facilities around it * * *indicate 
this * * *. I think the purpose was to test the weapon and see 
whether :it would work.'' 
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The 1·mumitteP wa:::; l'(llllimlPd that should the (lamnge t·au;o;(•(l by a 
lir:.-.. t :-;trike a!!ain:,;t the ·c.~. mis--iiP <tnll boml)(•r forl'es eX('f..'l'd en•11 thl' 
out1•r li:nit· c;f probability. the Polari:-; forc:cs would I't'lllaiu intact and 
,·apnJ,]e incll'pCihlently of launehin!! a (h>va:-;tntin~ retaliatory blow. 
('lrrnde.<?tine te.<;ting 
The committee waR told by the principal Gon'rnHwnt witne::;ses, and 
unclei-staJHls, that the treaty is not founded on the element of mutual 
t rnst. It i~ eonsidered to be self-enforcing. The advantages to be 
gained by "cheating" are generally not C"onsHlered to be worth the ef-
fort; in any case, the r .S . nuclear dete<'tion and idC'ntilil'ation capabil-
ity has reached a high level of performance aml reliability, ancl is !w-
ing steadily improved. The complex subject of clandestine tc:;tiug awl 
snrpri:=:e abrogation was t:>xhaust1vely discussed in the prepared state-
ments of Secretary of Defense Mc~amnra and Dr. Brown, found re-
~pecti\'cl r 011 pag-e !)7 and page n28 of the printed hearings, and wa~ 
t horou~ltly C'xmuinNl in executive ses.-:;ion with compete.nt witnes.<ms. 
IT oweYer, this single observation of Serretary ~I eN a mara's should be 
point eel np : 
The c·onscn~ns if; that the Soviet!'~ could not in a single ~eries of tl:'~ts. however 
<·:trcfnlly plannecl thosp might IJe. achit·n~ a si~nitkant or permanent l('fHl in the 
~~ rateg"if' flplll, much k"s a superweapon (·apabll· of nPutrnlizing our dt:!t•t'l'l'llt 
fort"e. 
_\ncl the committee was impres;-;ecl by this eomnH'nt of the .Joint 
Chiefs of Staff: 
• * * the daug-l'r" of <let£>ction and the co~t ::ncl uifficulty of tE-sting in outt>r 
~pac·e would tend to impos<> sen:>·re restrictions upon such clandi"Stine tPstinf.!. 
Othl:'r elandestine tests in the atmosphere or underwater, dciWIHling- upon thl•ir 
siz<'. would inn,lve a fairly high probability of detection by our com·cntlonal in-
t('lli!!t'nce or our atomic ener;.ry cletection system. ~fort>on•r, thP .J!Jiut ChiE>f!l of 
Stafr consider tbe resulting progress which the Sm·ipt;: mi~ht make dtlncl,~tiru•ly 
to he a r('lntively minor factor in relation to the oYerall preHent and probable 
balance of military streugth if adequate safeguards ure ruaintailwd. 
THE SAFEGUARDS 
J n evalnating the risks inherent in the treaty, the .Joint C'hit:>fs 
stated their belief that these "can be reduced through certain safe-
guards." These included (a) continuation of a comprehensive, ag-
gressive, underground nuclear test prog-ram; (b) maintenance of the 
vitality of our nuclear laboratory facilities and weapons programs; 
(r) the maintenance of a state of readin(>ss to resume atmospheric nu-
clear testing in the event of violation or abrogation of the trt:>aty: (d) 
the improvenlPnt of the multiple system desig-ned to detect and iden-
tif.v So..,·iet ( an<l Chinese) nuclear activity. 
These so-called safeg·uards generated considerable interest, and it 
should be observed thatl besides bt:>ing enumerated in the statemt:>nt of 
the .Toint Chirfs of Staff. they w·ere implif'ity and independently 
Pndorsed hy the Prrsi<lent and in the statemrnts of all the principal 
Government witnesses who preceded and follO\w<l the app<'aranee of 
the .Joint Chiefs. 
First. the Pre~iclent, in his ]ptter trnnf;mittill!! tlH~ treatY to thr> 
SC'nate, said: · · 
'l'bis treaty uoes not balt American nuclear progress. The United States has 
more experience in underground testing than nny other nation ; and we intend 
to n-;e this capacity to maintain the adequacy of our arsenal. Our atomic labor-
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uturit•s will maintain au acti\·e development pro,grnm, illl·lnding mHlcr;...rronud 
l<'!!tiug, und we will he reurly to resume te~o~ting in tlw atuHJ"')Ihere if IIC<'l·s~ury . 
<;uutluue<l rt•:;earch on developing U1e venceful uses or nto111ic energy "ill Itt> 
pos ... lule through underground testing . 
. \nd St·l·n•t.try of :-;tate Hnsk ~aid: 
Tht> pHlk;.· of tlw ( "nitl'd ~tates is to continue to test uwiPr~r,,und us 111'\ "l'' " 'tr.l 
tn ,.ur l<t'CUri t.r. )[ oreovl'r, altl.wugh we hoJIC for ('CIUlJJliu m·e. we t·n 11110t d b-
cotmt tlle )JIJs:-<iltilitr that the Sovil:'t t'niou may ,·iolatl' the treaty. \\." sliall 
lJI' o11 tlle alf'Tt for any violations. aml we have a bi~h degree of coutilh•uc·,• 111 
our ahililv to llNPct them • • •. I nru 1·ontident that. if ,.;i~nitkant tl•,.;tiB:.: in 
,·iolation ;,f the trl':tty htkes place, we will know about it. .\i1d we will he r end)' 
at ull tillH'"' to re,.;nme lt>:-~ling in all em·ironu1ents. nud promptlr. i ( that :-houl<l 
ht•conw uecc:-;,.;ar~·. 
St>rreta1·y of I>efpn .... t • )fcXamara, in a lettct· to the committee of 
.\ugustl!l,said: 
W(• wlll maiutain the vitality of our wE'apons lahomtorie:-;. ·we will con-
t imw to conduct a program of umlcrgromtd tests us IH'<'P~,.;ary to HtPet nur 
militnr.v re<tnin•mpntl'. This ongoing test program "ill al:.:o inclu<h.• tP:;ls 
11<•:--ignetl to las t lie fountln lion for a major a tmosvheric series 1 o tw I'O!Hl \let nl 
in cnse of Soviet abrogation. We will retain tlle admlnbtrntive ta le11t u ncl 
lo~:i,.;l il' <'U}JilhililiPs re<JUired for quick <'XJtan,.;ion of our h 'st program i11to ad<ll-
tional cnvirnmlWilts. \\·e ha\'e the determination to retain a rl:'adine"s to test 
in f'\'l'ry rl'le1·ant em·ironment. This i~; a firm national polic·y. h ,.; cxistPn<·l' 
will not only render the risk of abrogation minimal, hut will a lso l 'O ll'-'l it utl' 
a strong dt•IE'rrcnt to ahrogation. 
:o;onw (·oncHH was expre:-:-5(><1 on~r the ability to maintain the vitality 
of the lauorntorirs with a limitt>d t<•st ban in ffm'P .• \.lllong other~. 
thP Chairman of the .\tomie Em·r~··y Commi"':-;ion, Dr. Glenn T. Sen-
hnq.!. JH'o\·idt>d reas,.;nranee on this sc01·e. In rt> ·ponse to qurstion..,. 
I>r. SPahorg- obscl'\'ed that '·we didn't ]oRe YeT~' many" seiPntist s from 
thf' CommissioH~s laboratories during the :3-vear moratorium on tPsr-
iug-. lie added that the problem would be ·eased under the test ban 
tn•;lt y hN·ause oft he continuance of underground testing. 
D1·. York, a former director of the Lnwrence Radintion Laboratory. 
statNl that laboratory personnel grew by 50 perrl.'nt during a periml 
that roughly coincided \\--ith the moratorium. He added that-
Most ot the new JK'Ollle added during the moratorium period went into rcs~.>nreh 
arE'uS otb~.>r than weupons development and testing • • • bnt these new veople 
worked largely on programs which were sciNJtifically related to the wcapon-
Jll'ogram. un<l they w<>re at the place wh~.>rt> the knowledge wa~. wherl.' thP eqnip· 
llll'nt was, where the cnrn(mter prol!,"rUilll'l were. and tlw~ could be nnd, in f:t (·t, 
\\'l're rapidly converted to weapons sdenth;ts and emtinl·crs when lllat became 
11<'~'('"':-<a n·. 
Dr. Braclhury, Director of the Los Alamos ~rientific Laboratory, 
commented on the ability to resume atmosphere testing promptly: 
I believe, with a reasonable exvendlture, it could be possible to resume th<> 
airdrop type ot nuclear atmospheric test almost immediately upon notiee to 
Jtrocl'ed provided current normal preparations are continued and ~omcwhnt 
amplified. The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory would exped to bnYe deYice::: 
"upon the shelf'' ready for such testing when they had reached a stage of cle,;lgn 
within the Laboratory that could not be further improved by additional C'alcula-
tional or laboratory experimental effort. By such means the effect of abro.:{a-
tion upon immediate warhead development progress could be made minimnl antl 
primnrlly restricted to the area of actual yield determination of the hia-lw!-i r 
yil'ld wenpons. Again, It may be parenthetically noted that very few JIPOplP 
will l·are wlletber a given warhead bad a yield of 50 or 70 megatons, nor does ir 
mnkP much difference to the planners. 
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The committe<• also heard testimony expressing the determination 
of the executive branch to broaden and improve the complex detection 
system upon which the Cnited States would rely in lurge part to 
monitor the terms of the treatv. Information on the system itself is 
restricted data; however, such~ data convinced the committee that the 
possibility that nny power could advance its nucletlr weapons capabil-
Ity appreciably, or tlevelop such a capability, by clandestine testing 
in any one of tho for·bidden environments is negligible and, as such, 
an acceptable ri~k. Furthermore. the improvements plamwd for the 
P.S. detection system should minimize the risk even more. Finally, 
the rnited States has altemative means of detecting violations of the 
treaty and preparations of such violations. 
It is the committee's clear understanding and opinion that the safe-
guards will be maintained for just as long as the security of the 
Cnited States aliCl its allies requires continued nnelear devl'lopnwnt 
and te ting pmgrams, to!!ether with elnborate means of detecting ancl 
identifying the nuclenr activities of other nations. The committE'f> 
would also observe that the~ programs-the development and testing 
programs, the monitoring and detection improvement programs-are 
now and will continue to be the urgent busmes!:i of the r.S. Govern-
ment quite apart from whether there is a test ban treaty. The treaty 
does not impose new responsibilities upon the Government. By for-
bidding nuclear testing m three environments, it merely alters some-
what the manner in which these responsibilities can be carried out. 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Obligation-'1 to allies 
It was asked whether the treaty might possibly inhibit cooperation 
with our allies for defensive purposes. First, the treaty will not affeet 
the cooperative relationship between the United States and the Cnited 
Kingdom on nuclear weapons matters. Second, the Atomic Energy 
~\ct of 1954, as amended, forbids the transfer of nuclear weapon 
parts of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons to allies 
which are not nuclear powers. Similarly, it forbids the <'ommuni-
cation of data to assist a nation in the design, development, or fabri-
cation of nuclear weapons unless that nation has already made sub-
stantial progress in develoring nuclear wea~ns. Thus, the treaty 
itself does not bear on the l .S. relationship w1th such cotmtries. The 
treaty does prohibit the transfer of materials for use in nuclear 
weapons, or mformation concerning their design or manufacture, to 
any country that is testing nuclear weapons in one of the prohibited 
environments, or preparing to test in one of the!:'e environmentl". (The 
text of a letter from Secretary of State Rusk to the chairman r.overing 
this point may be found on p. 976 of the printed hearings.) Finally, 
the treaty will not affect bilateral agreements under which the United 
States transfers nuclear materials for peaceful purpose!'. 
The Plowshare program 
The committee understands that the Plowshare program, which 
involves the use of nuclear devices for peaceful purpose~. will not be 
seriously inhibited by the treaty. A great many, if not most, of such 
projects can be conducted tmderground and within the limits of the 
treaty. Dr. Seaborg t~>stified at length on this question and said: 
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Device de~elopment and the program for scientific studies planned for the 
imruediate Plowshare program can clearly proceed under the terms of the 
treaty. This is also true of applications for mining and water resource devel-
opments which would be carried out deep underground and involve the release 
of very little, if any, radioactivity. 
In the excavation application, however, some radioactivity will reach the 
atmosphere and a careful determination will have to be made that a gi~en 
vroject is permissible • • •. 
Our present considerations lead us to believe that excavation experimentl'; or 
projects which have a downwind distance of several hundred miles from the 
project site to a territorial limit probably can be conducted, and that these 
experiments will be sufficient to develop the exca~ation technology. 
The United States will also be able to explode nuclear devices under-
ground for peaceful purposes in other countries, at their request, pro-
vided, of course, that such an explosion does not cause debris to be 
issued beyond that country's territorial limits. If and when a project 
is proposed that might possibly violate the terms of the treaty-devel-
opment of a new Panama Canal with nuclear explosives, for example-
an amendment to the treaty presumably would be sought. The treaty 
will, however, prevent certain nuclear experiments in outer space that 
have been considered. 
With regard to immediate plans for canals, harbors, and excava-
tions, Dr. Seaborg said : 
We are not ready. It will take a few years of devic-e development and experi-
ments in excavation technology before we would be ready, and those things can 
be accomplished under the treaty. Also, some practical applications of actual 
excavation within the continental United States, when we are ready, c·an take 
plac·e within the treaty. 
Secretary of State Rusk was asked whether '·a little venting'' would 
be regarding "as sufficient cause to break the treaty.'' He replied: 
• • • if we got to that point. and so far as I know such a situation i~ ~:;everal 
years otl', if we got to that point, it would seem to me we might well want to 
inform other signatories to the treaty that we are proceeding with a particular 
peaceful uses explosion, give them the information to that etl'ect. IndeE-d, I 
think we may well get from the Soviet Union at some stage information that they 
themselves want to use an underground explosion for a partic-ular peac·eful uses 
vurpose. I would suppose that if it is quite clear what was involvNl and if 
there wafl some small accidental venting, I am sure that itself would not destroy 
the treaty. 
I would hope that such venting would not occur. Rnt as you pointf'd ont these 
things are not alwayc Cl\[lable of being guaranteed in advance. 
Radioactive fallout 
The problem of radio~tctiYe fallout was considered by the committee. 
though in less detail than some of the other questions, which, in the 
committee's Yiew. were of broader concern. It is generally agreed 
that radiation from fallout amounts to considerably less in terms of 
human exposure than normal back~ound radiation. Moreover, 
informed opinion appears to be that the radioactive fallout 
produced to date has remained well below a level at which it might 
be deemPd hazardous. But it is also clear, as the Chief of the Divi-,ion 
of Racli0logical Health of the r.S. Public Health Sen·ice said in .Tune 
of this year: 
Fundamental is the hypothesis that any amount of radhltion exposnre i11,·o1ves 
some risk in exposed i.)Opulation groups. 
Geneticist~ luwe shown f!Tea ter and more speci fir concern. 
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I~ is fenr('d. that continued, or stepp~d up. atmosphe~·ie nutll?ar 
rest mg would mcrf':l"e the damage, gc>net 1c a111l othPrWJS(', mduced by 
inf'rNised expoo:un• hy population :rrm1p,.; to ra<lintion. The treat~· . in 
halting tlw rPiea~l' i11to the atmo:;phl?re of r ndioactiw fallout, otTers 
;t distiuct l:x·1writ. ~foreover, grent Jllllllb(•r:-. of peopll' around the 
world hav(' IH'l'll deeply dist urbecl by tlH' implicntions of this fallout. 
It mn.v be th:t! tltcir c·onrern has heen hig-hly ex!ttrl.!eratf'<l. Nl'Yf'lihe-
le"--;, it Pxists. Tltt> ability of this lreaty to ease their concern must also 
be r<:'p:n nl<.'cl ns a hPrwficinl conseqnence. 
Dr•jinit;on o/ 1111rft r,(/1'0/Jilfl test 
Thf' HecrPtnry "'"" askl?d if aQ:reed crit4?rin hacl h('E.'Il <·stahlishNl to 
dt>tl?rm inP "hnt \~onst it ntes an nnLdergrouncl tec.:t. This is a l'ompl i<·at ed 
qne~tion : Yl?ry shallow ::mbsnrface tests may bt' more product~\·f' in 
tern 1s of knowlt'<lge gai11ed than deeper tests, and t lH.'.V are obnousl y 
eh4?apcr. S('cretary Rusk replied: 
* * • there are potPntially. looking ahead ovf'r th~> years, potentially many 
dozens:. perhaps even hundreds, of contin~encif'S wbif'h rui~ht !lt•velop tllrou~h 
technic-al advance or othcrwis:e, which I think eoul1l not ht> spelled out in 
detail in suc•b a treaty; it would e-ven be. I think. uuwis1• to attl'wpt to SJWII this 
out in the enormou" detail that would be required to try to unticipate all tlwse 
thina;s that we NJUld think about now because we wonlrl altuoi'1t certainly not 
think ohout som<' thnt Hrl' goiug to arise with technlral advance. 
~ow * • • obviously this treaty permits n clear nnder~~:ronnd test wh('rP t11e 
ex]llosion is underground, where the testing apparatus 1s: based on that pbPnom-
enmJ, ali(J I would think that we would not think that it appliNl to a surinc·e 
explosion whkh was c·hriRt(•necl by a few :::hO\'efuls of clirt, • • •. 
If these margin:ll thina;s oc-cur or any pretense is made with re,.;pe('t to it '"e 
will know almnt thrm aml we will ue able to take whatp,-cr tt<·tion is neec;.--ary 
in nnr own <.;CC'nrity. <'itlwr with respect to insi:o:tint! that it ht' :-tnPJII:'<l ur tht' 
trt>uty c-olhlfJses or • * • rt'SUillin)( our own freedom of ac·tion. 
Cortsu7tation nf .Joint ('hief8 of ' totf' 
En-rly in fh(' <·ommittC'C'·s hen rings, the ((lH'St ion aros(' as to whetlH•r 
the Yiews of the .Toint Chief~ of Staft had lwt>n :ul('qnately reprPS<>ntt>d 
in the cleY('lopmPnt of policy on the limitNl tP'-'t han trea ty and the 
contc11t of tlw tn·at , .. Se<'r<'tan of DPfPn~t' ~fC'Xamarn nn<l tlw .fnint 
Chiefs of Rtall' tc>s(ifi('(l on 1his question. Thf' hurdf'll of their fPsti -
mony s]H)W<'d tl1at tlH• t·hit>fs of tile unifnmwd SPlTi<'PS hncl beeu in-
t i111a't0ly invoh·e<l wi th the qne~t inn. Gen0rnl Taylor is a n11?mher of 
the C'ouunittPP of Principals, the top-1<•1 Pl 1111it "·irhin thf' Pxccnf i1·e 
hrnn('lt whic·h rnip"·s major questions of nd innal srcu r ily before t !tP.)' 
nr0 prpspn!f'd to the Pre. id('nt. ~\.s in(lir·nrNl e:trlit'r. :trti<·le IY, the 
rrer~ty\.; withclra,Yal ,·lau:o;e, " ·as implifiC'<l and m:ulP lllore fk~ilde 
to take ~H·mtmt of t lH• Yi4?ws of the .T oint Chit•fs of Stnll'. GC'lwrnl 
1V1H'e1Pr. ChiP f of~~ il n· of the ~'-rmy, ofl'erC'c1 I 11 is c·ommcnt : 
* • * the Chiefs haYe been • * • dealing with various types of te;:t han 
agreemeut-; for a couple> or 3 years * • * . You will re<·all tbur (~eneral Taylor 
* • • testifi(>(] fhnt starting on about the l:.ith of .Tnue, he ask('(] tl1e Joint Staff, 
n·ith thP knowledg-e of the other Illembers of the .Joint Chiefs of ~taff. to start 
to reYiE>w a pos:::ihle limited test ban propm;ul. although we hnd no ~ll€'eific 
wording to deal with. 'l'his arose as a re~mlt or tnlkR between a EurOJJean 
politiralle>tHler· and ;\fr. Kht-ushcbev. 
Y()n willfiiRo t·e<>all on the 211 of July Mr. Kbrnshche'' made a srx•erb in l<Jnst 
BPrlin, nt which time hf' !aiel down ln ratlwr ,:!ener·ni terms tht• type of treaty 
that would he nc:ceptnble to him. At that time, WP stePIJefl np the tempo of I>Ur 
ncti\·ities. 
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.\111! tlwu, of l·onr!"(', we were aware that the Harriman mis,.;iou was l!<tiu:.r to 
)J.,~·<•w. (;~>nerul Taylor, biml'elf, partidpated iu nwetiu~;.; of the comruit tee 
l'rln1·ipalN ou this ~nhjt•(·t. He did make us Hware of tbe results of tllt":<e delib-
f>r:ttiou s. .\url lluriu:.r the course of I be met>tin~s with ( 'mler Sl'ucta ry IIarri-
IIWil In ~l•1"<'(1W. eahles ,-uruc back and the Chairman briefed us ,-onccruiu:.r t!JPir 
l' llltl'lll s. 
I ht•lii'\'C! thE' ,Joint Chiefs of • 'tafT position on past JH'OJIW<:tls was well knowu 
within the (~overlllll!'llt. .\ntl certainly "e kuew on a day-by-clay hasis the 
t rem! of llll' dis('u,.,-.;ions in ~Ioscow. 
Parent hetiC'a1ly, it should be not eel that the .Toiut Chiefs of Stall 
~ouuht the Yiewf' of the Command<'J'S in Chief of tlw nine unifi<'d com-
matldf' on the treat~· .5 Senn of these nine supported the treaty. oue 
oppo~'<l it, and one disqualified himself on grounds of insnffirient 
kuowle(lg-P. 
I\'. COXCLt.:DIXG CU)DfEXT, 
The eommittee finds the balance of risks W<'ig-hted in fuYor of 
the treaty. It is po=--sible that by te.Bting underg-t.·ouJHl the SO\·iet 
TTnion will slowly erase the technological lead the rnitcd State:; pos-
S(·s.~ in some critical areas of nuclear developmenl. But it is equally 
trut>, as the hearing-s indicated, that this gap could he closed much more 
r:tpi<lly if unrt>sl rictNl testlng "'<'!'e continued. In short, the efl'ect of 
the trea.ty wiJ] be to slow the rate and signi.ficant.ly increase the ex-
pense of Soviet progress in those technological areas in which the 
Cnited States has superiority, while confining such prot,YJ.·ess as both 
sides may achieve to the nnder~ronnd em-ironment, where the United 
States has a broad advantage thanks to its experience. In that light, 
now would seem to be a good time to stop. 
For the rnited States~ the returns on further atmospheric nucl<'ar 
testing appear to hnve sharply diminished. l\1uch of what. remains to 
be ]parned can be achieved underground. Admittedly, fnrth<'r infor-
mal ion on weapons effects would be useful and would simplify errtnin 
de~ig-n problems. IIoweYer. the rnitNl Stntes nnd the Sm iet rn ion 
appNtr to face rou~hl~· comparable unrPrtainties and diflicuHie:-, ill 
thi~ ratlwr broad area. 
Dr. Tellt'r dis~cnted from the g<'JWral view, saying : 
To acquire more knowledge in order to know bow to defend ourselves, thl:-::, 
I wuuld !'nggest, is not (JUite properly called an arms race. 
This treaty will not prevent the arms race. It will stimulate it. This tr<'a tJ· 
is not uirected ag-ainl"t the arms race. This treaty b directed against knowlNll!'l', 
nut' knowledge. 
The committee disagrees. The treaty is directed against 1he nrms 
mce. The refineme11t of nuclear weapons is thr explicit purposP of 
t h<' pu rsn it of know ledge of this kind. All such know ledge i<..; reI a-
tin. Perhaps the ultimate know1Pdge of nuclear halli ,.:tic mis,i]e..,-
at ]Past. the only certain test of the missile syst<'ms- woulcl nwnn 
launehing a large '-'nlvo of ballistic missiles '~·-i't11 nuclear war11end~ 
0\'<'1' a_ distan~P of_ "eyera._J t~10usand mil~s and in~ercepting these ''<'np-
ons With <llltibalh~t I<' nuss1les, also cqutpped with \Yarheacls. 
6 The nine nre ComllllltHler In Chll'f. Enro(ll'; C'ommnn<ler in C'hll'f. Paclfil': Comman•l<'r 
In Chief, Continental Air Defense; Commander In Chief, Alaskan Command; Commander 
In C'blef, Caribbean; Commander In ChJef, Atlautlc; Commander In Chief Strike Command· 
Cummnn<l<'r In Chlel, StratE:>glc Air Command; Commander In Chief, Nn~nl ForcE:>s Easter~ 
-~tlnnllc nnd Mediterrnnean. 
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.\ n unre:--t riC'tPcl rompPtition to develop offen:-in :-ystems that will 
contint:P tn rPmain technologically far in adnmr(' of dPfPnsive l'iystems, 
nml. ~'OlH'l'!'r-el.v, to strive fot· defensive missiles that cnu close this 
gan. would amonnt to an arms race. Of that there can be little donht. 
· Dr. Bradbury told the committee: 
I am somPwhat dubious that one can ever find out in practice all that onp 
wonld idt?ally like to know and one may have to rely on simply what one ha;. 
found ont and what one run extrapolate from E-xisting experimental knowiE'd~('. 
It i " not feasible frankly to take an existin~ haliiRtic miRsile site. a Titan 
site. and drop a 10-meJlaten bomb over it. I don't think you wnuld like It or 
anybody eh:e would. l'nless you do that experiment, you c11n alwayR ~Y. "l 
will not know exactly what will happen.'' You have to rt?ly on what yon ran 
deduce now on strictly precise experiments, and my general feeling iM • • • that 
I would he willing to take the risk that we now can take with existing knowled):e. 
nlthou~th admittedly one is taking a risk. • • • I doubt that you would ever 
know all that you possibly could know. 
Dr. York Pxpre~c;erl similar cmwem abont a relentless competitiou 
for constantly improved and more refined arms: 
It is my view that the problem posed to both sides by this dilemma of steadily 
increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security has no te<>h-
nical solution. If we continue to look for solutions in the area of s<.'i.ence and 
technology only, the result will be a steady and inexorable worsE.>ning of thi" 
situation. 
I am optimistic that there is a solution to this dilemma; I am peeaimistir 
only insofar as I believe that there is absolutely no solution to be found within 
the areas of ~cience and technology. 
Repl,ving to a question he added: 
• • • I am concerned primarily about the fact that • • • if we do not do any-
thing about the arms race, the security of the United States will Just get steadily 
worse, will get less. 
Dr. Kistiakowsky's statement also reflected tllis concern : 
I do n•)t believe that we or any other nation can find any real S(l(·Urity in a 
continuing arms race. It is now evident that the L'nited ~tatt?t; and the HoviE.'t 
l l'nion each have the capability to deliver an utterly devastating attack on each 
other. To talk of winning such a contlict is to misuse the language; only a 
P,..-rrhic victory could be achieved in a nuclear war. Under the present condi-
tions of unrestrained arms rac-e It is certain that the numtwrs of warheads eaf•h 
side might deliver will increase, as will their yields. PE-rhaps even more threat-
ening is the prospect of an increasingly large number of eonntrie,:; havin~ nu-
clear weapons, with the concomitant increase in tht? probability that .son1e will 
be usE.'d and that uncontrolled esralation will follow. 
Dr. Brown was asked whether he regarded the treaty as an arms 
limitation agreement, and he replied: 
It does limit arms development. It does not reduce armaments but it does 
reduce <lriDS development. I believe that unless we get some kind of arms 
limitation as well as maintaining our own military capability the next 10 years 
are going to see further degradation in everyone's security n.s other nations 
obtain nuclear weapons. less responsible ones than have them now, I think that 
will make everyone less secure. 
I don't say this treaty is going to solve that or produre the mlllenium but I 
think in the absence of this treaty, which bas represented the tlr;;t !'•ep. no one 
can go on to anything else. 
ThP committee, no lp:=;.c; than the President, believes that-
no treaty. however much it may be to the advantage of all. however tightly it 
may be wordt?d, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and 
eva!'inn. But it can, if it is sufficiently effective iu its enforcement and if it is 
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... nfiiciPntly in tbe intere!"t~ of it.~ ~ignerR, offer far more <:ecurity :lDll fa r fewer 
rb.J.:s tbnn au uuallateu, uncontrolled, uniJredicta!Jle arUI:- rau:>.e 
The c(Jmmittee believes that the treatv reflects an identitv of in-
tflre .... t-. in tltP ~l'Prifi<· area of C'ontaining the arms competihori. Rorh 
I he Cnitecl !-'\tnte:-; awl the so,·iet "Cniou appear to han> a C:0ber UP!Jl'f-
f' iftl inn of the ha.zard implicit in the continuation of such a competition 
Let ween the world's two great powers O\'er an indefinite period of t imf' . 
B'll h appear t0 he persuaded that the limited treaty will not a-rpre-
l' inbly affer·t the balance of military power: al.so, that the clear political 
n clnllltage~ it otters will strengtlten the national secm·it~: of ea<"h. 
First. the treaty will inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, t}m..; 
rPolwing the danger of arcidental or catalytic nuclear war. as well as 
nuclear war by design. The committee was impressed that by the day 
it approved the trPaty 82 nations had af·ceded. Lea>ing aside France. 
already a nuclear power, and mainland China, this number inclncles 
nll those countries thought to han the capacity and / or incentive to 
dHelop nuclear weapons. 
SN·ond, tbe treaty has already deepened and complicated the di,·i-
sions within the Communist orbit; this, on balance, represents a net 
gain for the rest of the world. It bears heavily on the position of 
China, c,ommunism 's second-ranking and most militant po,ver. China 
is expected to explode a nuclear device in the near future, possibly next 
year. .\.lthough the distance from there to even a crude nuclear 
weapons system is considerable, the event will nevertheless impress 
Asians deeply with Chinese strength and potential. But the unwill-
ingness to sign this treaty, together with a generally defiant attitude, 
mA-y further isolate China from her Asian neighbors and, of course, 
from the rest of the world as well. This, in turn, should encourage 
greater rPsistance to Chinese expansionist policies. The treaty would 
nlsn seem to formalize, and thus simplify, the unwillingness of the 
~oviet rnion to assist China's nuclear development program. 
This identitY of rnitecl States and .S<>viet interest in limitin~ the 
arms raee is a: refteetion of what Dr. Shulman, one of the foremost 
.\.merican authorities on the Soviet Union, described as the "limited 
nclversary relationship" between the two powers. He said: 
* • • We are engaged in an extremely serious conflict but it is neither total nor 
absolute. In certain aspects af our confrontation, the security of each side is 
interlocked with the security of the other. It is therefore possible to have some 
measures which the Soviet leaders feel may serve their interests, and which vre, 
for reasons of our own, regard as in our interests as well • * •. 
Since 1954 there bas been a very considerable evolution of the Soviet apprecia· 
tion of the effect of nuclear war • • • an increasing sobriety, and this has a 
deep effect on the Soviet attitude. Within the past year and a half there has 
been a substantial increase in the discussion in Soviet journals of what in tbis 
<·onntry is <'ailed arms control, and what the Soviets cRll partial Jnea:;tne:o: of 
•li:o:armament. 
Dr. Shulman explainPcl further that-
the (Soviet) shift to "peaceful coexistence"' emphasis. originally a tactical alter-
nation, bas been evolving and deepening into a policy directed to power·bloc> 
politic~ rnther than toward social revolution. 
At the 20th, 21st. and 22d party congresses, and in the new Communist Party 
prog-ram, thiR policy has acquired doctrinal underpinnings, related to the possi-
bility of a )>eaeeful transition to socialism, anu the noninevitability of war * • • . 
• Remark!' of tbE' Pre~!dent at American University, Washington, D.C., Junp 10. 1963. 
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lk ~Inti man Lt>lien's that tht.> dl'l'P dum~es at work in the Soviet 
Gnion derive--
not from the proletariat, but from nationalism, which is fragmenting the polari-
zation of power, from technoloJ,!y, which is Increasing the destructlveue~;;s of 
war; nml from the con tinned industrial transformation of the advanced indus-
trial states, which has if anything increased their power nntl their prosperity. 
What t.be Chinese Communists nre now attacking as "revisionism" is in fact an 
I:'IIort l>y the ::lovict leadership, Ix>rhnps not wholly eonsdotL-;Iy, to adapt its 
policies to this reality. 
These changes are in part accountable to 'Vestern strength and 
determination and, as such, reflect credit on the basic postwar policies 
we haTe followed. Thus, it is critically important-for this ancl other 
reasons-that the solidn.ritv and determination of the "\Yestern alliance 
be mainta.ined. "\Ye have ~seen the tendency of the alliance to loosen 
whelleYer the ~oviet threat appears to haYe receded somewhat. .\n 
easing of cold 'var tensions would impose new stresses on the rela-
tionships between the "~estern nations; the treaty should lead to 
e>Ten stronger efforts to improve these relationships and the in-
stitutions throu~h which the 'Vest seeks to promote nnity of purpose 
a ucl pol icy. 
This will be difficult. For the rnitecl States it means that decisions 
affe1'ting the future of "~estern Europe must bt> madP with "·est Euro-
pean participation. Tlm::;, the United States must find and maintain n 
delicate but true political balance, and avoid giving even the impres-
sion that it may be unilaterally disposing of major questions di\'i<ling 
East and "'est. Europeans, for their part, must reco~nize that such 
questions arc> not, static, but changing. .Also, EuropPans, in ordE'r to 
play their role, will hopefully maintain the paf'e of tlw mo\·ement 
toward regional and supranational !"olutions to tlwir major tasks, 
n'I'O<rnizino· that thr--e h:we cn·ow11 too lar<r(' for anv one of EurOJ)e' · ,..... - ~ . ,...., ~ ' 
sovereign powers to contain. In ~hort, the movement toward Euro-
pean unity and .\tlantic partnership that has been p:atherin~ force 
since "\Yorlcl ·war II should proc•ee<l nnaffeeted h~· the rise :mel fall in 
the temperature of the cold "'~11' . 
. \. good l>art of the committee's time and atfpnt ion clming thl' hc>ar-
inp:s was c rvoted to military con:;idPrations. This trPaty (}O('S bear, 
thon~h perhaps not hc>avily, on the militarv balnnf'e. But its thrust is 
political. .... \ncl among other things, it il1ustrutes that military r-on-
siderations cannot be <livorcNl from political f'onsideration!-5; they 
are inseparable, espt.>!'ially in the nuclear ag-e. The ma.intPnnnce of a 
strong military posit ion is clrarly essential to the mttional security 
of tlw l ~nited States. Hnt ext:ln:-ive, or excessi\'e, rPiiancc on mili-
tary considerations could unclermine national security by enconra~ing 
comparable military efforts by others, thereby strengthenin~ the 
destabilizing forces adrift in the world, possibly creating new ones. 
This t reat~· oli'c>r,; the J>I'O~J>Pd of a ~raclual lessening of tensions, 
of a shut ten' <trcl tlw progressi,·e elimination of the danger of nuclear 
war. Thus, the eommit tee (by a Yote of 16 to 1) ref'omtHends that the 
:4enate give its advice ancl f'Onsent to the ratification of the pending 
treaty. 
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APPENDIX I 
AUGUST H, lOO:l. 
0PINIO:V OF THE LEGAL ADVISER 
HubjN·t: }leaning of the Words "Or Any Other Xu<:lear E:xplo;oion" Appcnrin~ 
in Article I, Paragraphs 1 und 2 of the Treaty Banning Nudt>ar Wl•Upon 
Te:<ts in the Atmo!Opherl', in Outer Space and underwater . 
• \rticle I, paragraph 1, of tbe Treaty provides: 
"1. Ea<"h of the parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to JH'l'\ eut, aml 
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or rwv otll cr 1wdt:ar 
'.l'Jil''sion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: • • *" 
.\rti<"le I, paragraph 2, provide!!: 
":!. Each of the Parties to this Trenty undertakes furtbernwr<> to refr:tin 
from l'ausing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the <'UrryiuJ.: ont 
of any nut'lear weapon test explosion, or any otllcr nucl<;ur c.rplo.~ion, auywlwrc 
whil·h would take place in any of the environments described or huve the l'ffc<·t 
rt'fened to in paragravh 1 of this article." 
'I'll<• question has been raised wh(•ther the words ''or any other ntH'll.'ar cx-
Jilol'iou" impose any limitation on the use of nuclear weavons by the vnrtic" in 
war. 
Tlw answer is no. 
I. 1IJE TEXT 0~· 1 HE TREATY 
TbP text of the Treaty and its internal construction provide ample grounds 
for unswering the question in the negativl:'. 
The title of tbe Treaty i!i "Treaty Banning ~nclear Weapon Te,;ts in the .\t-
IIIOl'Jillere. in Outer Space and Underwater." This title delimits tll<' operative 
SI'!IJIC of the Treaty. It shows that the Treaty was intended to dl•al with wea}r 
on tests and not with the use of nuclear weapons in combat or in eonnection 
with armed hostilities. The limited S<'ope of the Treaty in this re,;ped il' rein-
fon·ed by its Preamble. The second paragraph looks forward to mor(• gcn~ral 
tJi,..nrmament. eliminating the incentive to the production and tl.'stiug of JlllclPar 
W<'IIJIOUs. If this Treaty bamwd the use of such weapons iu wartime, the in-
c·c•ntive for further production and testing would already Jx> gone. ::)imilarly, 
the third paragraph of the Preamble, looking to the future negotiation of a 
c·omprehensive te~t ban, shows that this Treaty is limited in its appli<·ation 
to nuclear weapons tests. 
'l'he .\greed Communique it~sned wlten the Treaty was initiall<'d refer;.; It) a 
sNie~; of m<'etings to discnss "questions relating to tbe diRCont i nuauce of mwlpar 
h·~ts." It notes that agreement was reached on the •·text of n treaty bannin~ 
nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space. and underwatc>r." It 
refers to the agreement in !'CYernl places as "the test ban tn·nty." und it refl•r:-: 
~~~~·r-i tkn llr to discu~sinn" rela t iu~ to a noua,e~re);sion pact. IIH1l t be ne~ot in tors 
nt:r~>t•d to han the use ot' nnclear weapons in war it would surely haY<' heeu :ueu-
1 ioHI'(l in the A~reed Communique. 
:\lnrr•o\·er, the l!eneral selleme of th€' TrPnty is inconsistent with nn infl'l'Jll'€'1:1-
tlon ,,f the words, "other nuC'lear explosion" to coYer wartime use nf nucll.'ar 
Wl'R[Inns. The Treaty l1as no eftt•ct on laboratory deYelopment of nu<'l(•ar w<>np-
on:;. It permits weapons tests and other t:>Xplo);ion" underground, so lon11; as the 
rndionctl\"e debris Is confined w1thln the territorial limit!! of the StatP In wltich 
tbr l•xplo.-lou is conducted. The Treaty does not rE:'strlet weapons proc1uctlon. 
ns llJIJ'l('llrK from the seconcl paragraph of the Preamble. The So,·let Union llns 
rejl'<·h•ll nny pro}lOsal even to restrlc·t the production of fissionable mat(•riul for 
'>--1 
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ln.>upon~ purpose,.;. FinnlJ~· the Treaty doE's not requirE' tbe de:-otrnction of an~· 
-<tockpilecl ''capon!':. It is hardly coneeivnble thnt a treaty whieh permit,.. tht• 
tlPI'PloJlment, te~ting, sto<'kpiling, and production nf nuclear weupor1,.. slwuld ht• 
l'"m't nwd as bnn11in~ their Usl' in wartime. 
II. :SEGOTIATINU HISIOBY 
The cntlf'ln~ions deri' t•tl from the text of the TrNltY are l:HlPJ>e•rll'd hy u rtl it•w 
of the nej!otintln~ history. That history re1·eals tbut the words "or uny other 
nur!Pnr eXIJlosiuu'' were insm·ted to prevent evasion of the Trcuty by tlw explo-
sion in peaet'time of reste1l nuclear wE>apons, whether for peac·eful' ])urpose ... nr 
utl1erwise. 
Tht• ba~i" fnr thf' :\Io-c·ow npgut iations wa" the draft of the llmitt·d nul'it·ll r 
t1•st han trraty tabletl in (}pne~a on An!!n8t 2i, 1962, by the tinitPd ~tatt•s uTJfl 
Gniled Kin;.:dom delegations. Article I of lbat draft prohibited nueleur W(•apou 
tests. EXIllOSion~ W('re delllt with in Article II. Such explol;ions W('rt> {)('rmittP<l. 
but were to he l'ubjected to controls he(•ause of the dlmculty of tlistingnil'hlu;: 
pean•fnl purpose explosions !rom weapons tests. 
In the coUt·se of the :\lol;cow negotiations, the So,•iets rejected Artirl(' II of 
tlH• Au~~;ust 1962 dratt <:owpletely. TWs rejection would have left u loophol.- in 
tlw Treaty if Artide I had remained con1lned to "nuclear wea})()n test t>Xplo-
:-ionl'.'' A party wight lJuve conducted explosions revealing valuable mllltluy 
dutn or even weapon tests on the pretenl'e that tbey were in !aC't peaeeful pnr-
p•Jses e~"Plosiow~ und not "nuclear weapon test explosions." In order to ('lust• 
this loophole, the phrase "any other nuclear explosion'' was insertE>d in .Artic·le I 
at the appropriate points. Its purpose Is to prevent, in the tJpecitled enYirun-
mentll, peacetime nuclear explosions that are not weapons tests. Tbat is its only 
~il!ll i ficance. 
lU. GENERAL UNDERSTANDING 
'l'his (·Onl'tructiou of the pltrase "or any olber nuclear explolclion'' is supportl'd 
hr the public statements of t:nited States uud other offi<'ials prior II> lbe si~~;na­
ture and ratification of the Treaty. Thus, in his radio address prelclentlng tIll' 
Treaty to the American public, the President said: 
" [ ~] o nation's right of ~>elf-defense will in any way be impaired. ~or does 
this treaty ruean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not redu<·e nudf:'ar 
stockpiles: it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons: it will not re-
strit-t their use in time of war." 
The President's message trant!mitting the Treaty to the Senate for advi<'e ami 
con:-;pnt to ratification makes the same point,' as does Acting Secretary Ball's 
let t<•r transmitting the Treaty to the Prel'lident.2 Secretary of State Rusk re-
iterutt-d the point at the signing ceremony in Moscow, and again in his te!ltimouy 
hpforP the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There be said: 
"Thb Treaty does not atl'E'C't the U!le of nuclear weapons in war. It bas tll do 
with nuc·lear te!lting in time of peace." 
Tbi>~ understanding of the import of the Treaty is not con1ined to l'nitE>d 
l-;tatP!ol omcial~;~ alone. For example, t:nited ~ations Secretary-General U Thant. 
appearing in Moscow at the Treaty signing, listed a number o! "other equally im-
portant measureR aimed at the relaxation of tension." Among these he in('lucled 
the following: 
" I would also hope that the proposal. initiated in the !all o! 1001. for <'OnvE'n-
ing a Rpecial conference for signing the convention on the prohibition of tht> 
use of nuclear and thermonu(·le-ar weapons for wnr purposes. will now rf><'E>ive 
wider support." 
It would obviously bl? uunec·esi'ary to bold ~tH·h n (·onfE>rt>nl'E~ if thE> tPst hnu 
trNtty itself outlawed the nse of sucb weapons in war. 
1 "Wblle It wm not end the threa.t of nuclear war or ot~tlaw tAe tUe ofnt~cleor wenpo111, 
lt can rednee world teDJdollll, open a wa:y to further -.reemeuta, &Del tllereb:y help to ease 
tbe threat of war." 
1 "'l'be phrue '&D7 otber nuclear uploelon' lnclnclea esDIOBions tor peaeetul purpolll'll. 
Sueb ezplo1lon• are prohibited b7 the treat:y beeauH of tbe 414eulty of dUrerenttattng 
between weapon tnt ezploatone and peeeetul ezploatoae wttb011t at!dlttonal eontrols. Tb,. 
al'Ucle t!oee aot prohibit the ale ot nnelear weapo1t1 In the event of war nor reetrtet the 
exercl11e of the rtrbt of self-defense recognized In article ISl ot the Charter or the Unltt>d 
Nations." 
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I\". TACHCAL Wf.APO:'iS 
There ba~ IJccn sonH: :sugge,;tion that tl1e phra e ··or anr otllt•r nuclc,Lr exvlu-
:-;i t•ll" wight outlaw tbe u:c~e <1f tactic:nl, as oppo.,ed to ~trategic. weapons iu war-
tilu<'. Tlwrt• is no lm:-;i~ in the Treaty for making any di~tindion whatever lle-
tWf'i'll tuctiC'al and strategic weapons. The analysis in this Opinion applies iully 
to tnl'tiull a~ well as ~trategic weapons . 
.u>PEJNDIX II 
DHA!t'T TREATY BANNING XUCLEAR WEJA.POX TESTS IN THE AT:\IO~­
PIIEJRE, OUTER SPACE A~D UNDERWATER, AuGrST 2i. 19f32 
PREAMBLE 
The Governments of the Union of 'oviet Socialist Republics, the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Nortbern Ireland, and the United ~Hates of America. 
hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties," 
Desirous of bringing about tbe permanent discontinuance of aU nuclear weapon 
test explosions and determined to continue negotiations to tbis end. 
Confident that immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon t~t explosions in 
the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans will facilitate progress toward 
1 Lie early agreement providing for the permanent and verified discontinuance of 
nu1·lear weapon test explosions in all environments, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTIOLE I 
Obligations 
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the 
carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its juri;;-
dictlon and control: 
a. in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, or in territorial or high seas: or 
b. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be 
present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or 
control such explosion is conducted. 
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty Ulidertakes furthermore to refrain from 
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any 
nuclear weapon test explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the 
environments described, or have the efrect proscribed. in paragraph 1 of this 
Article. 
ARTICLE II 
Flzp los ions tor Peacctu Z Pur poses 
The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take 
11lace in any of the environments dE>scribed, or would have the effect proscribed, 
in 11aragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only : ( 1) if unanimously agreed to 
hy the Original Parties ; or (2) If carried out in accordance with an .\nnex 
heoreto. whi1·b .Annex shall constitute an integral part of tllio:; Treaty. 
ARTIOLE ill 
Withdrawal 
1. If any Party to this Treaty determines 
a. that any other Party bas not fulfilled its obligations under this Treaty, 
h. tbu.t nuclear explosions have been conducted by a 'tate not a Party to this 
'l'rl'uty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's 
national security, or 
c. that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is 
not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such ex-
plosions, if conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty, or, 
if not conducted by a Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national 
>.E'curity, 
it may submit to the Depositary Government a request for the convening of a 
conft.>rence to which all the Parties to this Treaty ~hall be invited, and the 
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l>t>positnry Government :<hall c·fm\'PllP :,;Uf'h a !'OllfPn'nc·p us !-loon utter its 
rP<'l'ipt of the requPst as mny he pructic·nhlr. The rPctnest for the• d<•ll:'rmiuinl! 
l'nrty to tlw DPpo:,;ltary Government shall hp ll!·l'omJlllniNl hy n statement of 
thP pvidenPe on whiC'h tht> rlPtPrminntion Wll>l hu:,;pcl. 
:!. ThP •·onfprenC'e :,;hall. takin~ into account the statemPnt of <'vich.•ure providPd 
1,~· tlw dt•terminin~ Party aml nn~· othPr relevant infortnathm. c:>xamine the facts 
:t!l(l as.;ess the sic:nifiC'Ull<'e of the situation. 
;{, After thE' conclusion of the conference or after the expiration (If a twriod 
of tlO days from the date of the reeeipt of th~> request for the c·nnf<'l'l'IH'P hy th<> 
l)ppositary Government. whicheYer is th<> <>arlier. any Party tu this Treaty mlty. 
if it dePms withdrawal from the Treaty nPcess!li'Y for itR national se<~nrity, ~in• 
nolic·e of such withdrawal to the Depositary Government. Such withclrawnl 
>'ha II take effect on th<> date specified in th<> notice, whi<'h >'hnll in no evf'ut he 
<>arliN than 60 days from receipt of th<> noti<·e of the Depo.:;itary Gon~rnment. 
The notice shall be aceompanied by a d<>tailed statement of the reasons for the 
withdrawal. 
ABTIOLE I\' 
Amendments 
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Trt>aty. The tPxt of any pro-
vo:;ed amendments shall be submitted to the Depositary Government wbi<'h shnll 
<:irculate it to all Parties. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or 
more of the Parties, the Depositary Government shall conYene a conference, to 
whi(•h it shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty or its Annex must be approved by a Yote of 
two-thirdR of the Parties, including all of the Ori~?:inal PartiN;. It shall <'nler 
into force for all Parties upon the deposit of ratifications hy two-thirds of the 
Pnrtit•s to this Treaty, including ratification by the Original PartiC!-1. 
ARTICLE V 
,-;;gnature. Ratification, Accession, Ent1·y Into Force a11d Revistrutiou 
1. This Treaty shall be open until to all ~·Hates for signature. 
_\ny State which does not sign this Treaty may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory Stutes. Instru-
ment!> of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with tlle 
G-overnment of , which is hereby designated the Depositary 
Government. 
3. 'l'bis 'l't·eaty shall <>nter into force on for ~Hates which 
han' dCllosited instrum~nts of ratitl('ation or accession on or before that date, 
lJroYi<lc<l that the rati!kations deposited include those of the Original Parties. 
If ratific·ntions by all three Original Parties are not d<>posited on or before 
------, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which ratifica-
tions by all of thE>m have been deposited. 
4. Instruments of ratification or accession deposited subsequent to the entry 
into force ur this Treaty Ahall be-come binding on the date of deposit. 
:>. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all signntory and 
accPding States of the date of each signature, thE> date of deposit of each 
rat ific·ation of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into for<.-e, 
a111l the date of n'<:Pipt of any requests for cunfereuc.-es ur notiees of withdrawals. 
Ci. Thi-.; Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Government vursuaut to 
.\rti<:lt• 10~ of the Charter of the l;nited Nations. 
ABTIOLE VI 
.Authentic Te:Dts 
Thb '.rr('aty, of whi t·l.! the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, 
;.hall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Go,·ernment. Duly certified 
copiE>s of this TrE>aty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Government to 
thP Gm-ernments of the signatory and ac<.-eding States. 
h wxT:vEss wnEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this 
TrNl.ty. 
Do:n: at . this --- day of , one thousand nine 
llundred and sixty-two. 
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